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I begin this work with a simple question. Why is it impossible to imagine, much less
write, a work like Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish within Asian area studies?
The impossibility I am referring to is not of content but of form. It is not just about
writing such a text  but  about having it  read as something more than a description;
having it read for its theoretical significance more generally. That is to say, it is about
the impossibility of writing a work that is principally of a theoretical nature but that is
empirically and geographically grounded in Asia rather than in Europe or America. Why
is  it  that,  when  it  comes  to  Asian  area  studies,  whenever  “theory”  is  invoked,  it  is
invariably understood to mean “applied theory” and assumed to be of value only insofar
as it helps tell the story of the “real” in a more compelling way?
To some extent, what follows is an attempt to explain historically how Western area
studies on Asia came to appreciate theory in this limited and limiting way. At the same
time, as I  began to investigate the history and prehistory of  this diaphanous field,  I
began to recognize the possibilities of a very different form of area studies that could
have emerged had different sets of pressures pushed it in a slightly different direction.
This essay is therefore an attempt to recuperate these now forgotten possibilities and to
build on them in order to produce a different way of seeing, writing, and theorizing
Asian area studies.
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Je commence cet article par une simple question. Pourquoi est-il impossible d’imaginer,
encore  moins  d’écrire,  une  œuvre  comme  Surveiller  et  Punir  au  sein  des  Etudes
asiatiques ? L’impossibilité à laquelle je me réfère n’est pas liée au fond mais à la forme.
Il ne s’agit pas seulement d’écrire un tel texte mais de le faire lire comme quelque chose
qui soit plus qu’une description ; le faire lire aussi pour sa portée théorique. Il s’agit de
l’impossibilité d’écrire une œuvre qui serait de nature essentiellement théorique mais
qui, empiriquement et géographiquement, serait basée en Asie plutôt qu’en Europe ou
en  Amérique.  Pourquoi  donc  la  théorie,  lorsqu’il  s’agit  des  Etudes  asiatiques,  est
invariablement comprise comme une « théorie appliquée » dont la valeur ajoutée repose
sur sa capacité à raconter l’histoire du « réel » d’une manière plus convaincante ?
Dans une certaine mesure, ce qui suit est une tentative pour expliquer historiquement
comment,  en  Occident,  les  Area studies  sur  l’Asie  en  sont  venues  à  comprendre  la
théorie de cette manière limitée et limitative. En même temps, lorsque j’ai commencé à
étudier  l’histoire  et  la  préhistoire  de  ce  champ  diaphane,  j’ai  pu  apercevoir  les
possibilités d’une forme très différente d’études régionales qui auraient pu émerger si
différents  ensembles  de  pressions  l’avait  poussée  dans  une  direction  légèrement
différente. Cet essai est donc une tentative pour récupérer ces possibilités désormais





There is a story told today about an event in ancient China where in five
hundred archers were said to have been dispatched, on the emperor’s express
orders, to a coastal location near Hangzhou that was about to be reclaimed by
imperial engineers. There, in an event that enabled the commencement of this
major project, arrows were fired into the sea to ward off the dragon god. These
“opening shots” are, in a contemporary Western recollection of the event, said
to be “ceremonial,” warning the dragon god not to make (violent) waves. Yet
the  object  of  this  form of  “ceremony”  and the  “engineering”  project  that  it
“celebrated” were, in fact, of equal weight, for both were designed to outwit the
dragon  god  and  fend  off  the  tempestuous  sea  so  that  the  land  could  be
reclaimed for the emperor. The techniques differed—the archer used the bow,
the  engineer,  science  and  technic  (in  Georges  Bataille’s1  sense)—but  their
objects were identical. Yet when this account is retold in our time and in our
functionalist logic, it becomes a story of scientific discovery, and the archers’
tale  is  relegated to a  “ceremonial  space” somewhere on the margins of  this
main  scientific  account.  For  me,  while  the  functionalist  analysis  is  a  useful
corrective to idealism, there is much more to tell, both in the archer’s tale and
in its retelling as “ceremonial.”[1]
1
How  much  can  we  trust  the  unity  imposed  by  this  (positivist)  narrative
strategy?  Surely  the  instrumentalist  (re)telling  of  the  archer’s  tale  as  a
“ceremonial aside” within an overarching story of a developing technical and
scientific  proficiency should set  off  a  ripple  of  doubt.  After  all,  the  story  of
scientific  curiosity,  technical  advance,  and  careful  and  exact  inquiry  into
currents, winds, and sea patterns, a tale familiar to any contemporary Western
reader, now appears stalked by another (more ominous) figure. The shadow of
2
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Story Two
the inexplicable “other” side and “other” logic darkens this figure of ceremony,
which  threatens  to  turn  the  tranquil  and  familiar  waters  of  “our”
comprehensibility  into  something  far  more  uncertain  and  incalculable.  To
“read” sea currents anthropomorphically, as the emperor surely did when he
dispatched a team of archers to tame the sea dragon, threatens the exactness of
calculation and the economy of science that contemporary positivist accounts
of these events promote. It threatens to disrupt the unity of what Bataille2 once
described as the “homogeneous world”—that is, a world of production, science,
technic,  and  rationality—with  the  disquieting,  inexplicable  murmur  of
“unproductive”  excess  and  transgression  that  he  would  come  to  call
“heterogeneity.” It is for this reason that, in (re)telling this tale within a story of
scientific development, it proves all too tempting to render this heterogeneous
event as “nothing more” than the popping of a champagne cork, the smashing
of a bottle on the bow of a boat, or the “ceremonial” firing of arrows into the
sea. It is convenient to treat this moment as that ceremonial preface that is
always already familiar to us and, one may care to add, that thereby comes to
count for very little.
The reproduction of this event as a mere “ceremonial” aside—a somewhat
comical, eccentric interlude before the “main act”—or better still, to retell this
heterogeneous  tale  homogeneously  by  describing  it  as  the  “ideological
[ceremonial]  kernel”  around which an otherwise  healthy scientific  seed was
growing, is not only designed to make us feel we have left the troubled and
threatening sea for the security of more solid ground, but also to describe the
very basis of  the Western scientific method. And it  is  in the work of Bruno
Latour  and  the  retelling  of  another  seaside  tale  that  the  most  compelling
evidence of this point can be found.
3
In  the  final  part  of  Latour’s  remarkable  account  of  the  development  of
scientific  method,  he  illustrates  his  argument  about  “science  in  action”  by
recourse to the narrative technique of allegory. Scientific “action at a distance,”
in Latour’s exemplification, takes place on a faraway island (in the distance),
with  the  visit  of  a  Western  boat  (action)  and  the  recording  techniques,
transmissions, and finally incorporation into a Western canon of the captain’s
notes  (science).[2]  This  parable  of  science,  almost  in  opposition  to  its  own
emphasis on rationality, begins, like most fairy tales, with the dawning of a new
day:
4
At  dawn,  17  July  1787,  Lapérouse,  captain  of  L’Astrolabe,  landed  at  an
unknown part of the East Pacific, on an area of land that was called “Segalien”
or “Sakhalin” in the older travel books he had brought with him. Was this land
a peninsula or an island? He did not know, that is, no one in Versailles at the
court  of  Louis  XVI,  no  one  in  London,  no  one  in  Amsterdam  in  the
headquarters of the West Indies Company, could look at a map of the Pacific
Ocean and decide whether the engraved shape of what was called “Sakhalin”
was tied to Asia or was separated by a strait.3
5
As Latour points out, it was the task of the comte de La Pérouse to solve the
riddle  of  these  lands.  With  notebook  in  hand and “native”  before  him,  the
captain began a process of extraction that culminated in revelations being told
6
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about this land and the mysteries that surrounded it. La Pérouse’s role was not
to write down everything his informants told him. His task was to extract from
the otherwise “fuzzy, approximate and sometimes ungrounded beliefs of local
knowledge” what was deemed to have value as scientific raw material4. Having
extracted, La Pérouse then compressed. Lengthy tales of gods and legends were
“translated” into more “rational” instrumental accounts. The scientific seed was
extracted, the information translated, and the detail compressed into a mere
diary entry. The lived knowledge of the indigenous informant that had taken
years to acquire was noted down in summary form that would require no more
than a few hours to write and much less time than that to read. La Pérouse
would then move on to other islands, other accounts, other extractions, other
compressions,... other translations. The indigenous inhabitants’ stories would
be told time and time again, but in a translated form they would neither know
nor recognize as their own. While they drew maps in the sand for La Pérouse,
told  him of  gods  and serpents,  and used their  version of  time—a map was
drawn to indicate how far their canoes would take them in one day—to indicate
distance, this information, when it found its way back to France and into that
elaborate  dispersed  knowledge  machine  that  was  the  scientific  community,
would end up taking on a very different form.
There,  within  this  community  of  scientists,  technicians,  and planners,  all
dedicated  to  making  the  world  manageable,  intelligible,  and  portable,  La
Pérouse’s  notes were translated into details  that  would enhance the “bigger
picture” of the world known in the language of Western cartographers as the
navigational chart. The islands La Pérouse had “discovered” and the details he
had taken from the  indigenous  inhabitants  now reappeared  in  a  translated
form as a mark on a map. It is this map that marks the distances traveled not
only by La Pérouse’s boat, but also by Western scientific mapping.
7
From the earliest Christian T-O maps that placed the holy city of Jerusalem
at their heart[3] to the later, more elaborate medieval maps that were like logs
of  pilgrimages  undertaken and wondrous religious  sites  seen,  charts  of  this
European past  were  largely  elaborate  ideological  mapping  exercises5.  These
intricately coded systems, carrying both ideological and geographic meaning,
display  a  European  sensibility  very  different  from  the  one  in  which  La
Pérouse’s “discoveries” would finally find their home. Sometime between the
fifteenth and seventeenth centuries the tour disappeared and the itinerary was
put under erasure. The stories of life, travels, and tours were “flattened out”
and vanished. No longer a heterogeneous collection of ideologically invested
signs, the map became instead the site of a new clustering of knowledge we
would come to call interdisciplinary. It would draw on the fields of geometry,
navigation, and observational ethnography and “speak” in the table-language of
science rather than in a dialect of the pilgrim’s tale. Maps became the “proper
places  in  which  to  exhibit  the  products  of  knowledge,  [and]  form tables  of
legible results”6. This “colonization” of space by the map and chart was one of
the effects of the birth of science7. With science, rather than religion, now being
the  guiding  ethos,  the  map  was  transformed  into  a  very  different  type  of
instrumentalist “technology.” Ultimately, with new additions and clarifications,
it would redraw the world along vectors that would make a return journey from
Europe  to  the  islands  of  La  Pérouse  not  only  possible,  but  far  more
predictable8. Extraction, translation, mobility, and an ability to combine with
and reconfigure other elements of an existing story; this was the very stuff of
8




It  is  also the “stuff”  that  ties  Latour’s  vignette  of  La Pérouse back to the
contemporary  account  of  an  ancient  Chinese  “engineering”  work.  Like  the
extractive  “science  work”  undertaken  by  La  Pérouse,  this  contemporary
account of ancient Chinese dyke making extracted the “ceremonial” conditions
and translated the valued remainder into something that could be combined
with  other  knowledge.  It  would,  by  exclusion,  define  what  was  deemed the
“essential component” of indigenous knowledge. Having removed the dross, it
would confidently (re)classify the building of dykes as an “engineering project.”
Both  this  story  and  that  of  La  Pérouse  are  tales  of  extraction,  translation,
mobility, and an ability to combine with and reconfigure other elements of an
existing  story.  They  are,  methodologically,  discrete  domains  of  “science  in
action,” and, as one moves from the natural sciences toward the nascent social
sciences and from the end of the eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth
century,  one  discovers  that  the  buried  ideological  effects  of  this  “rigorous,”
“objective,” and “scientific” remapping of the world would take another name:
imperialism. To excavate this requires moving to my third and final vignette.
9
At the end of the nineteenth century, in the middle of Paris, the Exposition
Universelle opened its gates to the French public and its sights to the public
gaze. The world, as Timothy Mitchell9  puts it,  was thereby enframed. It was
rendered, Mussorgsky-like, as a picture at an exhibition, but one that clearly
put  trade  “in  the  frame.”  The  earlier  Crystal  Palace  exhibition  in  England
offered a stunning example of this. Exhibiting space was granted only on the
basis of the value attributed to what one had to sell. It was on this basis, and no
other, that nations and space were reordered in a calibrated hierarchy which
led  to  the  non-Western  world  occupying  small,  marginal  corners  of  the
exhibition site: non-Western countries had little of value and therefore little to
say in a world ordered around the market and the modern. Indeed, the vast
majority of the non-Western exhibits were supplied by European colonialists
who  treated  these  lands  and  their  commodities  as  little  short  of  a  joke.
Costumes, trinkets, carpets, and hookahs appeared to be the standard array of
goods, says C. R. Fay10 in his account of Crystal Palace, and these sat somewhat
uncomfortably alongside the West’s latest technological inventions. Here was a
mapping exercise very different from the one that occupied the mind of  La
Pérouse, but the logic and method behind it were eerily familiar. Extraction,
mobility, and an ability to combine with and reconfigure other elements of an
existing story  was not  only  the stuff  of  science in  action,  but  clearly  also a
central part of imperialism in action.
10
Like  secularized  T-O  maps  of  old,  these  trade  fairs  reveal  an  ideological
remapping of the world with the West in the center and its agenda on top. In
Paris this would be embodied by Gustave Eiffel’s tower, the ultimate sign of
Western  artistic,  engineering,  and  “natural”  brilliance.[4]  Mimicking  the
structure of plant life in a manner that would later find full artistic expression
in the photography of Karl Blossfeldt, Eiffel created an engineering masterpiece
using  load-bearing  iron  girders  connected  in  a  manner  reminiscent  of  the
common plant. Yet there was nothing “common” about Eiffel’s tower. Built for
11
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the Exposition Universelle and located in the center of the site, it offered an
overview of all below and stood as the ultimate sign of Western (and bourgeois)
dominance over nature and the world. As if to reinforce this, on the grounds
below,  and  in  the  shadow  of  the  tower  itself,  sat  another  sign  of  Western
dominance,  a  French-built  Egyptian  exhibit  that  reproduced  perfectly  a
winding  backstreet  scene  from  Cairo.  Such  perfect  reproduction  was
confirmation of Western brilliance, not simply because of the architecture of
the streetscape but because of the Western technical ability to replicate, in the
heart  of  Paris,  the  soul  of  Cairo.  Here  was  a  streetscape  complete  with
traditional Egyptian house veneers and the facade of a mosque modeled on the
one  in  Qaitbay.  Here  was  a  street  scene  populated  by  imported  Egyptian
donkeys  complete  with  handlers  offering  rides,  Egyptian  dancing  girls
entertaining the passersby, and French traders dressed as Arabs selling trinkets
from their bazaar stalls. Even the dirt on the painted buildings was replicated11.
Old Cairo was transported and in the process transformed. Yet this process of
transformation—from lived social form to sideshow—only confirmed the power
of the West to extract, replicate, and make anything, anywhere, portable and
intelligible in its own terms.
It is with this form of mimesis, where the eye is firmly fixed on transporting
things into the homogeneous world, that the logic of the trade exhibition, the
diary  of  La Pérouse,  and the contemporary rendition of  traditional  Chinese
engineering meet. It is in these three stories that one confronts the relationship
between science, translation, and the epistemic violence of imperialism. The
West,  it  seems,  could  translate  anything.  Through  the  spread  of  scientific
method, texts, buildings, and even life itself were opened to the West’s gaze.
The tower of Gustave Eiffel became its Babel and the new universal message
was that science could conquer all and would make the world whole and wholly
intelligible. A new universal language was emerging, not out of the rubble of
philology or even out of language proper. Rather, this new universal language
was  “reason”  and  its  battering  ram,  capitalism.[5]  Capitalism  dreamed  of
flattening  the  world  in  the  way  science  had  once  flattened  the  monastic
pilgrimage maps into navigational charts. Now the desire to trade would flatten
difference. Consumption and material desire would point to a new universal
language.  Materialism  would  obliterate  the  dialects  of  dissent,  be  they  the
sacred, the opaque, or the heterogeneous. The homogeneous world would be
victorious and, like the colonialists of old, would redraw the map and paint
each land in its own colors. If the nineteenth century held out this promise, it is
in the twenty-first that we are now being told the promise is being fulfilled. As
globalization spreads, it cuts its way through different cultural and lived forms
and leads  to  claims  not  only  about  shared  desires  but  also  about  a  shared
universal logic of desire. It is in critiquing this logic, a logic now transformed
into a more general “style of thought” and sometimes spoken in the “objective”
language of the contemporary social sciences, that I want to begin to speak of a
dialect of potential dissent offered from within a new type of Asian area studies.
It is my contention that, if reconfigured into a domain that speaks to, and of,
the  occluded  heterogeneous  world  of  otherness,  Asian  area  studies  has  the
potential  to  send  ripples  of  doubt  through  the  dominant  positivist  social
science “stories.”
12
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Bringing the Stories up to Date
Basing themselves on a (predominantly nineteenth-century) notion of how
the  “hard”  sciences  work12  these  social  sciences  have  produced  “applied”
models that enlist the now familiar methodology outlined above. Indeed, it is
through this methodology that they now lay claim to being objective, rigorous,
and  scientific.  This,  of  course,  involves  the  eradication  or  dismissal  of
unwanted  signs  of  the  heterogeneous  that  cannot  be  incorporated  into  the
homogeneous  world  of  “their”  reason.  Nowhere  was  this  process  more  in
evidence than in the ongoing, troubled marriage of comparativist social science
modeling and the scholarship that supplied these models with much of their
“raw”  data  on  other  cultures.  As  this  marriage  disintegrates,  one  begins  to
notice the social scientific process through which that which cannot easily be
incorporated is assimilated, then repressed. Yet, as is clear from the tale of the
Chinese dyke builders and their penchant for “ceremony,” “the mystery that is
incorporated, then, repressed, is never destroyed.... history never effaces what
it buries; it always keeps within itself the secret of whatever it encrypts, the
secret of its secrets”13. It is in disinterring this “secret of its secrets” that the
heterogeneous possibilities of a new area studies of the sign are revealed, and
the radical potential of the field made real. But there is much to do before that
possibility can be realized.
13
As a geographically defined area of study, rather than a theoretically driven
discipline, area studies had long argued that it was interdisciplinary but, as it
looked over its shoulder at the “hard” social sciences, it was stalked by the fear
that it had no discipline at all. The social sciences had for years made this claim
about  area  studies,  and their  response,  in  arguing  for  a  more  “area-centric
knowledge,” only reinforced the suspicion that area studies was indeed a field
dominated by descriptive “social translators.” Lacking the type of theoretical
and “scientific” rigor the disciplines claimed to offer, area studies defined itself
only  in  the  shadows  of  other  disciplines  and  reified  its  unique  quality,
translation. But it was this “one thing” that would damn it in the eyes of social
scientists.
14
The most recent and formidable critiques of area studies come from political
science, and of those the most vocal is Robert H. Bates.
15
In a  series  of  articles  that  damned area studies  for  lacking the necessary
theoretical rigor to rival the social sciences intellectually, Bates called for a new
approach that would merely reinforce the already existing role of area studies
as  subservient  subordinate  translator.  Social  science  knowledge  would  be
privileged  in  this  arrangement  for,  unlike  the  translational  practices  of  the
empirically based area study, only it was “equipped to handle area knowledge
in  a  rigorous  fashion”14.  For  Bates,  at  least,  the  new  universal  “scientific”
techniques  deployed  by  the  “rigorous”  social  scientist  were  all  versions  of
rational choice theory. With this approach, cultural difference becomes but one
variable in a “game” that is constantly reworked to “prove” both the particular
argument being proffered and, more important, the universalism of the model
being  deployed.[6]  In  fact,  all  that  this  model  building  proved,  if  proof  be
needed,  was  the  logocentric  nature  of  the  paradigms  that  dominate  the
contemporary social science disciplines. The faith of political scientists in both
the  rationality  of  political  actors  and  in  the  objectivity  of  their  theoretical
models required only empirical verification. It was at this point that the social
16
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sciences  would  require  local  translators  from  whom  they  could  gain  useful
descriptive information that could be reworked into empirical proof of their
scientific theories. For the social scientist, the usefulness of the local knowledge
supplied  by  the  area  studies  specialist  was  therefore  also  a  sign  of  the
theoretical weakness of the field. In many respects, area studies had only itself
to  blame  for  this  predicament,  for  it  has  always,  and  quite  promiscuously,
offered itself in this way.
Within the subfield or area studies I know best, a line can be traced from the
very  earliest  Jesuit  encounters  with  China  through to  our  day  and,  despite
massive shifts in what and how objects of desire are translated, the model of
the  area  studies  scholar  as  translator  remained  dominant.  Indeed,  the  one
defining  characteristic  of  the  sinologist  was  this  ability  to  translate—  both
linguistically and culturally. As David Mungello15 points out in his examination
of some of the earliest European attempts to theorize China and its language,
theorists always seemed to have “knowledgeable friends.” Gottfried Leibniz had
Joachim Bouvet, Athanasius Kircher had Michael Boym, and Christian Mentzal
had Philippe  Couplet,  in  much the  same way that  Julia  Kristeva  “had”  her
sinologist-translator, Marcel Garnet. Even when theoretical opportunities did
emerge  as  possibilities  for  area  studies—as  happened in  recent  times  when
Edward  Said  rendered  the  empirical  relationship  between  “Europe  and  its
other”  theoretical  by  describing  it  as  an  ontologically  and epistemologically
charged  “style  of  thought”—they  are  brought  down  to  earth  and  employed
within area studies as a means to reinforce what could only be described as the
“translator’s advantage.” Paul Cohen16, who offered possibly the first detailed
response from within Chinese studies to Orientalism, employed this work to
authorize his “China-centric approach,” which was little more than a critique of
theory based on an unreconstructed (and unrealizable)  form of  empiricism.
Why is  there  such truculent  antitheoretical  empiricism within area studies?
The  reasons  are  manifold  but  one  key  reason  that  has  never  fully  been
scrutinized relates to training.
17
Western area studies knowledges are language-based and learning languages
has  come to  operate  as  a  “rite  of  passage”  into  Asian  area  studies  for  any
scholar.  Yet  it  has  also,  unconsciously,  become  much  more  than  that;  the
narrowly defined applied nature of area studies—which lies at the heart of its
truculent  empiricism—is  based  on  unconscious  appropriations  from,  and  a
close kinship to, the types of methods employed in language training itself. This
methodological  kinship  between  textual  and  cultural  translation  is  not
fortuitous, I would argue, but emerges from a path taken out of the philological
tradition by Oriental studies, a path that would become fully developed by the
time  it  was  named  Asian  area  studies.  What  I  want  to  suggest  is  that  the
transition from classical philology, of which Oriental studies was a part, into
comparative philology, from whence it departed, laid the intellectual ground on
which area studies’  descriptive and applied translational practices reified an
observational method of knowledge acquisition. It is this history that I want to
retrace in order to bring forth a repressed alternative of  “doing” that  could
establish the basis for a very different Asian area studies.
18
Philology,  that  “empirical  science  of  the  spirit”17  as  Ernest  Renan  so
romantically called it, was a nodal point in a discursive field that not only gave
birth to linguistics, but also played a key role in the formation of Oriental and
later  Asian area studies.  While  it  is  certainly  true that  Oriental  studies  was
19
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irreducible to philology and philology was much more than Oriental studies,
the degree of interpenetration and mutual authorization for works undertaken
within these paired fields was nonetheless significant.[7] Oriental studies was
crucial to philology insofar as the Oriental languages gave added impetus to the
changes  within  language  study,  which  then  moved  philology  away  from  its
search for a theological origin. The philological tradition was, in turn, pivotal to
Oriental studies, because it predisposed the field to a way of seeing that would
add  a  social,  political,  economic,  and  cultural  dimension  to  Roman
Jakobson’s18 now famous formulation that anything is translatable. It was this
type of formulation that would solidify and stabilize around the methodology of
applied language appropriation and translation; for, as is well known, language
is the one and only unifying criteria of this field.[8] This would then be reified
by  the  protocols  of  academic  publishing  and  the  utilitarian  demands  of
missionaries,  colonialists,  governments,  and,  more  recently,  business.  The
“applied” nature of this field came to set the boundaries for what would become
an acceptable  form of  scholarship.  In  other  words,  the  applied  methods  of
language acquisition shone a light on more general forms of applied knowledge
acquisition.
The  repetitive,  rote  learning  techniques  employed  to  acquire  language
inadvertently reinforced a particular understanding of the relationship between
“text” and “interpretation,” and this would then “solidify” into a mimetically
recoded  and  quite  classical  binary  between  “real”  and  “thought”19.  This
“slippage”  would  then  produce  a  set  of  unconscious  understandings  that
dialectically  fed  back  into  the  general  scholarly  program  of  area  studies,
producing a tautological justification for the “realist,” empiricist, and “applied”
approach to knowledge acquisition. The self-evident obviousness and pregiven
“realness” of the text became metonymically linked to the pregiven obviousness
and  realness  of  “nation”  or  “culture”;  and  it  was  this  form  of  “applied
translational practice” that came to constitute the very basis of  area studies
knowledge.[9]  While  there  are,  of  course,  “stakeholders”  (government  and
business,  to  name  but  two)  demanding  this,  the  particularly  trenchant
resistance to theory within this field is not reducible to mere outside pressure
groups. The point I want to stress is that there was nothing inevitable about the
field’s developing in this way. Indeed, a focused reading of its history opens a
window onto other ways in which it could have developed and may yet still.
Indeed, it is the purpose of this genealogy to highlight just this possibility.
20
I use the term genealogy rather than history quite deliberately. What I have
written  is  not  history  in  the  traditional  sense.  Thus,  experts  in  any  of  the
various subfields that operate under the rubric of Asian area studies, be they
China, Japan, or Indic studies, may well fail to see their own subfields’ history
fully and clearly explored in these pages. That is because the tale I wish to tell is
not merely an amalgam of all of the constitutive parts of Asian area studies. In
other  words,  the  order  of  appearance  of  events,  or  the  relative  weight  or
standing of concerns within any of these subfields, is not merely a version of
the  area  studies  field  in  miniature.  Area  studies,  quite  to  the  contrary,
selectively  developed  some  concerns  and  not  others,  and  the  order  of
appearance  of  what  would  become  important  may  not  have  been  reflected
equally in all  fields.  Thus,  in research on China the philological  urge would
remain long after it had faded in other branches of area studies. Similarly, the
concerns of colonial governance would fuel an interest in administration and
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observation that would be much less powerful in research on countries that
were not colonized. Rather than plot the development of each subdiscipline and
explore the way in which they contributed to the development of the field as a
whole, I have focused instead on those practices within philology and Oriental
studies that would either come to direct the discursive field or to play a pivotal
role in the formation of the field. This essay is, therefore, very much a “history
of the present,” for I am interested in how area studies came to be formed in
such a way that its radical potential was neutralized. It is my contention that in
employing  this  genealogical  method  in  a  scrutiny  of  Asian  area  studies
practices and prehistories, the field turned its back on certain possibilities that
could  have  and  could  yet  transform  area  studies  into  a  more  theoretically
informed set of intellectual practices. Like the seas that constantly lashed the
dykes  in  Hanzhou,  the  alternative  area  studies  of  which  I  speak  offers  the
possibility  of  eroding  the  shorelines  of  certainty  on  which  the  practices  of
homogeneous social science incorporation have been built.
By  broadening  out  and  theorizing  its  understanding  and  appreciation  of
language study, area studies would come to recognize the theoretically charged
nature  of  any  notion  of  linguistic  and  cultural  difference.  Through  this
recognition, a set of practices could be adopted that not only would help area
studies  overcome  its  empiricism,  but  would  also  expose  the  “epistemic
violence” of social scientific model building that currently attempts to colonize
area studies. A careful examination of the prehistory of area studies not only
helps explain why a type of ideologically invested, logocentric, but theoretically
informed, translational practice gave way to a descriptive “applied” one, it also
helps  situate  a  recuperative  move  from  within  the  trope  of  language  study
itself.  After  all,  the  study  of  language  lies  behind  many  of  today’s  most
“dissonant” scholarly practices.
22
From  Lacanian  psychoanalysis  to  the  structural  anthropology  of  Claude
Lévi-Strauss, language formed the basis on which a set of new grammars of
understanding  came  into  being.  Barthesian  semiotic  studies  also  drew  on
linguistic notions of the signification process to formulate a social  semiotics
that  would  reveal  a  “latent”  (connotative)  meaning  behind  the  explicit
(denotative)  one.[10]  Like  area  studies,  these  three  discrete  grammars  of
understanding owe their very existence to philology, but what they would take
from this now defunct field was a set  of  practices very different from those
adopted by area studies. And while none of these is without its own problems,
they at least share the common virtue of appreciating that “language has not
only a grammatical logic but also an historical memory”20, and this forces them
to explore a world that goes beyond the “manifest” descriptive and empiricist
forms that  dominate  area studies  knowledges.  They hint  at  the possibilities
available for an alternative “way of doing” language study that is theoretically
nuanced, culturally embedded, and speaks directly to the language core of the
area study knowledge form.
23
Despite an abiding logocentrism, philology also (and from its very earliest
moments) employed a set of buried semiotic practices, which enabled language
and knowledge to be tied together in a quest for the truth of the cosmos. They
would also infect the early days of Oriental studies and lead the young Victor
Hugo to proclaim that “in the century of Louis XIV one was a Hellenist: today
one is  an  Orientalist”21.  This  enchantment  with  difference  underpinned the
privileged status Oriental studies once occupied within the Western academy
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and,  in a  radically  different  and far  less  theological  way,  has reappeared to
inform  postcolonial  discourse  as  a  parallel  and  possibly  rival  humanities
discourse to area studies social scientism.
To validate the myriad of contentious claims made in these opening remarks
requires a detailed examination of philology and a recognition of that field as
the  precursor  to  Oriental  and  Asian  studies.  Such  recognition  not  only
highlights the translational nature of Asian area studies but also helps locate
the  suggestion  that  more  recent  theoretical  reflections  on  translational
practices speak directly to issues that should be central considerations within
Asian studies. In short, this close examination of the prehistory of Asian area
studies raises the specter and possibility of other ways of “doing Asia.” To begin
to  develop this,  however,  requires  a  detailed  mapping  of  how the  field  has
become a domain of applied translation, and to tell this tale requires starting,
as all good stories do, at the beginning. In this particular case, that beginning is
Genesis.
25
In the first book of the Bible, we are told how Noah’s three sons, Shem, Ham,
and Japhet, settled on the plains of Shinar and attempted to build a tower to
touch the gates of heaven. We are also told of God’s response.
26
Where once there was one language and one people, God’s wrath led to their
being scattered and their tongues confounded. Where once “word” and “thing”
were one and humankind basked in the wisdom and unity of the “name giver”
Adam (who, despite the Fall, was still the most knowledgeable sage the world
had  known),  after  Babel,  what  John  Locke  later  described  as  “the  trick  of
words” prevailed.[11] Undeterred by God’s wrath, later Christian philologists
would  try  to  build  a  new  tower  and  recover  this  “primitive”  transparent
language, but they would avoid heresy by building on scripture.
27
Read  literally,  the  Bible  offered  a  road  to  redemption  and  a  clue  to  the
recovery  of  the  original  transparent  language,  itself  a  path  back  to  the
wholeness of humankind. Whether one started from the book of the original
scribe,  Enoch,  or  from  Babel,  a  reading  practice  developed  that  Jacques
Derrida22 would later describe as the theological prejudice and Hans Aarsleff
would call Adamicism, a notion, Aarsleff stressed, that went well beyond the
question of “resemblance,” for it was too infected by the religious to be reduced
to this one notion.[12] The point to note is that, by the sixteenth century, “in
becoming Bible-conscious, Europe became Babel-conscious”23.
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The  literal  reading  of  the  Bible  fueled  a  scholarly  quest  for  origin  that
informed  the  endeavors  of  archaeologists,  philologists,  linguists,  and
theologians alike. It led to studies of arcane language forms that centered on
the language of the Bible. If truth were to be found in the revealed nature of
Scripture, then the language of Scripture must be the earliest.[13] Hence, under
the  influence  of  the  Church,  scholars  of  the  Renaissance  period  sought  to
recover the original primitive language, as early philologists called it, for this
language  would  unlock  the  oneness  of  humankind.  This  early  comparative
language study involved the comparison of biblical “words,” especially verbs or
nouns (words of action and naming words) as “signs” that could lead to the
(re)discovery  of  the  original  primitive  language.  At  the  center  of  this
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teleologically  conceived  quest  was  a  belief  that  inscribed  in  origin  was
immanent future. Variants on this theme would eventually lead away from the
Semitic  languages  to  those  that  displayed  an  arcane  and  distinctive  form.
Chinese, because of its pictographic characters and ancient lineage, proved to
be of particular interest.
In  this  regard,  the  work  of  the  Jesuit  Athanasius  Kircher  was  both
idiosyncratic and exemplary. Like many before him, Kircher ascribed central
importance to overcoming the “word-thing split,” and this, in turn, led him to
value  highly  the  pictographic,  nonphonetic  language  forms.  He  saw  a  link
between Chinese characters and Egyptian hieroglyphics and argued that this
pointed to a genealogy of the greatest import24. Kircher was not alone in his
high valuation of  Chinese.  John Webb25,  the first  to write in English of  the
importance of Chinese script, was also the first to posit the idea of Chinese as
the “mother tongue” of God. While Origen believed the non-Semitic world had
been left to God’s angels, Webb suggested they had simply avoided the great
flood and, therefore, the wrath of God.[14]
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Webb’s  argument  highlighted  a  minor  trend  in  late-seventeenth  century
scholarship known as the Noachidian theory of descent. In essence, Noachidian
theory put forth the idea that Noah’s three sons, Shem, Ham, and Japheth, had
gone  forth  and  spread  God’s  Law  throughout  the  world,  including  Asia.
According  to  Leibniz,  the  prominent  German  astronomer  Johannes  Kepler
drew on this  idea  to  suggest  that  the  origins  of  Chinese  civilization  bore  a
“remarkable similarity to the Noachide theory”26 . This theory was, however,
greatly challenged because of the reduced role it attributed to the Jews as the
chosen people. Clearly, if China was to be so highly valued, the role of the Jews
would,  by  necessity,  diminish.  That  was,  of  course,  until  the  discoveries  at
Kaifang.
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“On May 16,  1707,”  Maurice  Olender27  tells  us,  “Le Journal  des  Scavans
announced  to  its  readers  ‘a  very  important  discovery’  made  in  K’ai-feng
[Kaifang]  in  the  province  of  Hunan,  China.”  The  Jews  of  China  had  been
discovered  and  their  lineage  led  back  to  a  time  before  Christ.  From  these
ancient peoples, it was hoped, an authentic, uncorrupted version of the Bible
would be found and Providential truth would be restored. The long simmering
controversy over the 1546 decision of  the Council  of  Trent to recognize the
Vulgate as the sole authentic biblical text would finally be challenged by this
news from the East.
32
Alas, such hopes would not be realized. By 1723, textual research revealed
that the Kaifang version of the Bible was virtually identical to the Amsterdam
one28. Nevertheless, this failed to diminish the belief held by some that within
the  ancient,  sacred,  and  mysterious  scripts  of  the  East  an  answer  to  the
Western “self ” could be found that would prove revelatory. As God was slowly
replaced by Mammon, this  search for an original  language that was itself  a
search  for  origin  was  joined  by  a  newer  set  of  influences  emanating  from
mathematics.  The  slow  emergence  of  the  experimental  sciences  led  to
speculation  about  a  new  kind  of  language  key  that  would  be  based  on
mechanical and mathematical principles29.
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In crucial respects, this new tendency was itself religiously based insofar as it
relied on a methodology employed in the religious exegetical tradition, which
searched  not  for  an  original  language  but  for  “a  universal  matrix  for  all
languages”30. That is to say, it sought the universal formula beneath the surface
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of language. The mystical cabalistic techniques of textual decoding offered an
example  of  this  religious  practice,  and  they  would  later  play  a  key  role  in
informing the calculus-based language-generating schemas of Raymond Lull
and Nicholas of Cusa31. While such techniques began as a mechanism for the
revelation of hidden religious truths and, in Lull’s case, offered the possibility
of conversion to the universal Truth of Christ, they also led, in part, away from
the unity of the Church: like other tendencies abroad at this time, they raised
the possibility of challenges to the canonical status of Church readings based on
Latin translations.
The principle challenge to Latin, however, came not from language research
but  from Protestantism,  which  refused to  accept  the  truth  of  the  canonical
Latin translations offered by the Catholic Church. Latin’s inability to offer an
incontestable textual certainty would lead to its decline. Hence, what was once
the  universal  language  of  “the  known  world,”  held  together  by  sacred
commitments  was,  by  the  sixteenth  century,  a  language  in  rapid  decline32.
Increasingly,  universality  would  come  not  from  a  shared  language  of
communication but in the form of shared formulas. By 1662, even the Royal
Society had abandoned Latin and, within thirty years, the French society did
the same. The universal language that had tied Christendom together on the
basis of a shared set of linguistic expressions of that religious commitment was
no more. In its place there emerged a new linguistic nationalism, on the one
hand, and a growing scientific language of universalism, on the other.
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Perversely,  this  decline  in  Latin  led  to  increased scholarly  concern  about
language, which translated in some quarters into further research on language
keys. Through the development of such “keys,” it was hoped that any linguistic
meaning  from  whatever  language  group  could  be  immediately  translated,
thereby obviating the need for a single universal language33. In this respect, the
decline of Latin and the rise in interest in language signaled the shift from an
old, religiously based form of universality to a new, more abstract one that was
being imagined and written in  the  language of  science  or  pseudoscience.  A
desire  for  a  new  language  or  a  new  understanding  of  language  based  on
logarithmic and algebraic principles was emerging34.  From Francis Bacon to
Robert Boyle, this desire found expression in the various schemes to promote a
new, “rational” language; one that would mimic the symbolism of science itself.
A  new  way  of  seeing  was  therefore  slowly  emerging  out  of  old  exegetical
methods.
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This shift from the exegetical to the “scientific” signaled, according to Michel
de Certeau, a movement from symbol—where hidden textual meanings were
interpreted  by  authorized  commentary—to  the  “cipher”—  where  analytical
techniques  offered  a  “totalizing  taxonomy”  and  “universal  instruments”  to
ensure “comprehensiveness.” The “cipher,” as de Certeau35 notes, was a model
that could only come into effect through a homology between erudition and
mathematics. Yet while symbol and cipher appear to speak to different worlds,
they were not entirely oppositional: both grew from the same desire for God’s
truth and for linguistic “transparency.” Science, therefore, could work in the
interests of the one true religion. Unity could once again be restored, but this
time it  would be proven through the universal  truths of  science.  Indeed,  as
Renan  notes,  philology  would  create  the  “irrefutable  scientific  basis  for
Christianity” and establish a “firm and objective link” between Christian truth
and scientific truth36.
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Once again, the nonphonetic basis of Chinese proved wondrously portentous.
Jesuit  linguistic  discoveries  in  China  seemed  to  work  in  sympathy  with
scientific innovations in the West to awaken interest  in the character-based
script of Chinese. At the very time symbolic algebra was forging a new universal
community of understandings among scientists, built on shared knowledge of
symbols  and  calculi  rather  than  shared  linguistic  knowledge,  China’s
character-based  language  was  found  to  offer  an  example  of  these  same
principles  at  work  within  language  itself.  The  religious  privilege  became  a
scientific one, as Chinese appeared to be an identikit of what Bacon would call
“Real Characters.” Chinese, however, was not the only non-Western language
to be privileged, nor the only one to undergo a partial revolution in the way that
privilege was ascribed.
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If  the  search  for  the  Primitive  Language  venerated  antiquity,  then  the
discovery in 1785 of the ancient Indic script of Sanskrit, which was far older
than any Semitic language, would, as Schwab notes, put the final nail in the
coffin  of  a  world  considered  to  be  only  biblical.  He  argues  that  this
(re)discovery not only upset existent philological  theory but,  given the early
language scholars’ insistence on the unity of language and humanity, opened
the whole of scholarship to its impact. The problem with this argument is that
by the time of  Sanskrit’s  (re)discovery,  the old philological  argument was a
mere shadow of its former self. Even within the religious community the idea of
a  primitive  language  had,  by  this  stage,  given  way  to  a  belief  in  linguistic
diversity  before  Babel  and  to  the  radical  idea  that  linguistic  confusion  was
natural37.  Moreover,  the  view of  script  itself  as  sacred had long  since  been
eroded, as interest in primitive languages developed into the studies of mother
tongues38.
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Nevertheless,  even  in  accepting  these  important  caveats,  one  should  not
dismiss  Schwab’s  thesis  in  toto,  for,  as  even  Umberto  Eco  admits,  these
theological arguments faded rather than vanished.[15] Moreover, even in faded
forms, these old theological arguments unconsciously reinforced the prestige of
this ancient language that was now being openly privileged on a very different
basis. “All the human sciences,” writes Olender39, “from history to mythology,
and soon to include ‘racial science,’ were affected by the discovery of a tongue
that was known not only as Indo-European but also Aryan.” Sanskrit would
seal  the  fate  of  those old biblically  based attempts  to  forge a  close  alliance
between philology and theology, for the idea of the Semitic languages as origin
was no more. At the same time, however, it opened up new intellectual vistas.
In this new world of scholarship, the privilege of Sanskrit would derive less
from its  senescence than from its  relationships with European languages.  A
substantial part of its newly privileged status came from the central place it
occupied in Franz Bopp’s new field of comparative philology. The importance
of Sanskrit to Bopp and other comparative philologists largely rested on the
findings of Sir William Jones (as articulated in his 1786 presidential discourse
to the Asiatic Society). He was the first to make the now famous correlation
between the  internal  structure  of  Sanskrit  and European  language  forms40.
According to Jones, Sanskrit was very close to European languages for it “bears
a stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs and in the forms of grammar, than
could possibly have been produced by accident”41.
40
Whether one followed Friedrich von Schlegel, who argued that Latin, Greek,
and the Germanic and Persian languages were all derived from this “mother
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language,” or Bopp, who suggested that Sanskrit was merely the “elder sister,”
is  of  little  consequence,  for  the  question  of  the  root  language  had  lost  its
importance42.  What  mattered  was  Bopp’s  insistence  that  Sanskrit  exceeded
both Greek and Latin in structure and clarity. Hence, he argued that it was of
the  utmost  significance43.  Sanskrit  seemed  to  possess  a  dual  privilege.  It
retained its  status  as  a  romantic  language par  excellence,  for  it  opened the
Western world to a knowledge of the sacred texts of the East; yet at the same
time it played a privileged role in the new “scientific” discourse of comparative
grammar. In relation to this, Schlegel’s work was critical, and two aspects of his
scholarship in particular would come to revolutionize philology and its ways of
carrying out research. Indeed, it was on the basis of these two innovations that
philology would come to represent itself as the science of language.
First,  according  to  Max Müller,  it  was  Schlegel  who came forth  with  the
propositions  necessary  to  undermine  the  belief  in  hierarchical  classes  of
languages  predicated  on  age.  In  place  of  this,  Schlegel  suggested  smaller
language  families  that  were  aligned  less  by  ancestry  than  by  shared
grammatical  structures.  Schlegel,  in  examining  the  languages  of  the  world,
concluded by linking the significant European and classical languages together
and then back to  Sanskrit.  Thus,  while  the terms “Indo-German” or  “Indo-
European” language group were not his inventions, they were nonetheless an
outcome of his work.[16]
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Second, Schlegel  developed the method of “comparative grammar,” which
provided the theoretical basis for a detailed construction of language families
and groups.[17] Comparative grammar offered, for the first time, a systematic
means by which to trace language connections and privileges on the seemingly
more scientific basis of syntactical structures. Schlegel’s comparative grammar
displaced the previous emphasis on the word. No longer would one inquire into
the  essential  architecture  of  the  word;[18]  instead  one  would  focus  on
grammatical  totality.  The  effect  of  this  was  significant  for  it  broke  the
connection between language and human activity that had sustained the great
philological homology between language and knowledge. With Schlegel’s work,
philology  moved  from  this  classical  emphasis  on  reconciliation  of  the
“word-thing  split”  toward  a  more  comparative  frame  where  grammar  and
structure were central  to  all  inquiries.  Philology was no longer anchored to
references in the Old Testament; it was no longer tied to grand homologies. In
place  of  this,  one  discovers  a  more  detailed,  “rational,”  but  esoteric  and
introspective study of language structures.
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In this transformation one can see the beginnings of the “disciplines,” yet at
the time the importance of this shift was far from clear. The reasons for this
opacity  had  to  do  with  the  dual  register  by  which  philology,  like  Sanskrit,
valorized its privileged status. As Aarsleff44 has noted, comparative philology
had all the hallmarks of a new “model science,” but it kept these behind a cloak
of “spirituality.” Comparative philology maintained the high culture claim to be
“opening the sacred books of the East” but now did so on the basis of “rational”
scientific methods that enabled it to slide easily into a new world of rational
disciplinary divisions. This shift to the more limited disciplinary mode was to
have profound effects, not only in terms of the later discipline of linguistics, but
also on the overarching field of Oriental studies.
44
“Linguistic finalism” would transform this once theologically inspired search
for  origins  into  a  more  limited  but  “rational”  and  “scientific”  search  for
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knowledge. Hence, the legitimacy of philology was no longer religiously based
but dependent on the scientific claims it could make and the “form” of rational
argumentation it followed. In terms of the latter, therefore, there were constant
attempts by philologists to associate their discipline’s methodology with those
of  the  empirical  sciences.  Schlegel  compared  comparative  philology  with
Georges  Cuvier’s  comparative  anatomy.  “Comparative  grammar,”  he  wrote,
“will give us entirely new information on the genealogy of languages, in exactly
the same way in which comparative anatomy has thrown light upon natural
history”45. The methodology for dissecting language, it seems, was the same as
that  which  ordered  and  dissected  the  human  body.  Methodologically,  the
science of the living body and the science of the spoken word were kindred
spirits. For Müller, the science of geology was a more appropriate analogy,[19]
for one could compare rock strata in a quarry in the same way as philologists
would compare language grammars. And just as one would dig in a quarry and
find ever more ancient layers, so too one could excavate language and discover
its past. Yet this search was no longer stoked by those old religious fires that
dreamed of bringing to light the unity of languages and peoples. By this time,
even when philology looked back to ancient languages, it also looked “inward”
to  their  syntactical  structures.  The  one  compensation  in  all  this  for  the
religiously inspired was that this new positivistic approach would offer a more
scientific means of translating the truth of Christ into other languages, making
possible  more  Christian  conversions.  Hence,  Müller’s  suggestion  that  the
development of comparative philology was a shift from the metaphor of Babel
to that of the Pentecost was not without a certain materiality!
Where Babel spoke of humanity recovered, the Pentecost spoke of heathens
converted. The metaphor of the Pentecost focused on religious salvation, and
comparative philology now had a new technical and scientific means to advance
this end. Thus, while the proselytizing and evangelical aim of the Church was to
save souls, it was, of necessity, built on a bedrock of both colonial conquest and
good translational skills. Little wonder that, for Müller, this shift tied the new
light of God into the very heart of this new science. For him, philology would be
the “technical”  means by which the light  of  Christendom would shine forth
upon the heathen. Moreover,  it  would give birth to a new positivistic social
research program in which “old words assumed a new meaning, old problems,
a new interest, old sciences a new purpose”46. Through this new program all
peoples would become susceptible to “the highest mental culture”47.
46
It  is  at  this  point,  and  with  these  words,  that  a  crucial  factor  in  the
development of Oriental studies begins to reveal itself. “Europe and its other,”
that intellectual fulcrum generating Oriental studies, reveals its Janus face in
this Pentecostal claim and, in a very Schmittian way, even in these early days,
shows itself to be political.  This desire to convert is the very point at which
“faith fights errant faith” and this, as Carl Schmitt so clearly shows, is the most
intense of all political moments48. As a religious quest, “Europe and its other”
carries hidden within itself another potential translation: “friend and enemy.”
47
It is this important religious element in the development of the science of
comparative philology—a development that would give birth to both a politics
and a field that would eventually, and in a secularized and much more overtly
political form, take the name Asian studies—that one would miss if one were to
read the account of the development of philology rendered by Foucault in The
Order of Things. Strangely, for the author of Power/Knowledge, this element
48
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The Absent Orient of Michel
Foucault
of the story and its implications are completely absent.
For Foucault, the key element in the episteme that was marked, in part, by
the  emergence  of  comparative  philology  was  not  the  expansion  and
comparativism  of  the  field,  and  much  less  its  political  implications  for  the
colonial  world.  What  is  important  for  him  is  the  way  that  the  advent  of
comparative  philology  announced  a  particular  moment  in  Western  reason
when one could no longer speak of language being close to knowledge itself.
Instead,  as  he  puts  it,  a  notion  of  reason  came  to  prevail  that  would  lead
language to “fold in upon itself” and reduce it to a mere object of inquiry.[20]
Henceforth, studies of language would speak only to the internal architecture of
language,  and  while  this  was  a  demotion,  this  particular  demotion  had  its
“compensations” that would trail across an array of fields and leave a mark on
the Western mind. One of these “fields of compensation” would speak to the
heart and encourage a privileging of the creative language of literature. Another
would speak to the head, leading to the “table-language” of those who dreamed
of scientific transparency. Still another would speak to a form of reason, the
architecture of which was to be found in the syntactical structure of language
itself. In all three cases, Foucault traces the shattering effect these “remnants”
of the once powerful field of philology would have on the Western notion of
reason as they splintered into other domains. There is, however, one splinter
that his otherwise expansive account does not trace, and that is the emergence
of  Oriental  studies  as  a  discrete  field.  This,  at  first,  may  seem  like
Eurocentricism.  After  all,  The  Order  of  Things  is  organized  around  the
appearance  of  “Man,”  and  for  Foucault,  this  appearance  led  to  a  dramatic
rupture  with  classical  forms  of  knowledge,  of  which  the  understandings  of
language were a central part49. It was for this reason that language once again
acquired an “enigmatic density” at this time. As we have already seen, such
“density” around language was nothing new. What was significant in this new
episteme  was  that  this  “density”  emerged  not  because  of  the  search  for  a
primary  word,  but  because  of  the  ability  of  language  study  itself  to  create
conditions for an epistemic disruption of that cosmology of the word. Indeed, it
enabled the creation of a series of metalanguages through which the grammar
of Western thought could be questioned. It was the appearance of “otherness”
and “dissonance” that,  Foucault argues, would come to orientate the critical
accent of nineteenth-century thought.
49
From the grammar of words (Nietzsche), to the grammar of economic life
(Marx),  and,  finally,  on  to  the  grammar  of  those  “unspoken  phrases”  that
inhabit  our  unconscious  and  speak  of  our  desires  and  dreams  (Freud),
Foucault’s reading highlights the productive “otherness” of these “disruptive”
discourses.  Yet  the question remains,  What of  the “disruptive”  otherness  of
languages  and cultures  of  the non-West?  They may lack the single,  famous
“proper  name”  like  Marx,  Nietzsche,or  Freud  through  which  to  summarize
their project but, given their disruptive effect on philology itself, surely they,
too,  are  worthy  of  a  “proper  place”  alongside  these  disruptive  voices  of
50
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European “otherness”? After all, part of their appeal to the nineteenth-century
romantics  was  that  their  material  “otherness”  to  the  culture  and  logic  of
Western thought helped define the very notion of European selfhood. Given
this, the exploration of the human condition (that is, the emergence of “Man”)
must surely relate in some ways to the emergence of Oriental studies and help
account for its once privileged role.
As I have shown, studies of the Orient and its languages had, in the past and
in part, been sutured into the theologically inspired quest for origin. And even
after this theological quest for origin was no more, one could still find examples
of romantic Oriental scholarship proffering the idea of an exotic yet profound
Eastern knowledge that speaks to all of humanity. Oriental studies could still
lay claim to a certain gravitas by keeping alive some of these pretensions.
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Consider, for example, the fact that many of the romantic writings about the
non-West appear, in hindsight, to have been as much a description of certain
unconscious preoccupations and repressions about self—prior to the invention
of these terms—as they were an exploration of non-Western societies. Could
one not posit, for example, that much of the romantic literature discussing the
journey  of  Eastern  knowledge  was,  in  part,  an  empirical  metaphor  and
elucidation of what would now, in a very different “language,” be described as
the  fort-da  relation?  Could  one  not  also  point  to  the  endless  mimetic
appropriations  of  Eastern  knowledge  as  one  moves  from Jules  Michelet  on
individual  intuition,  Edgar  Quinet  on  liberty,  Adam  Smith  on  universal
sympathy, and, more explicitly, the Physiocrats on good government?[21] This
list  of  buried signs of  significance is,  in fact,  endless,  and if  it  is,  as  I  have
suggested,  a  key element in the formation of  Western knowledge,  then this
Oriental  splinter  of  philological  discourse  should  have  been  of  the  utmost
importance to  Foucault.  After  all,  the significance of  this  particular  splinter
seems to suggest that there could be no discussion of the emergence of “Man”
within  that  domain  of  knowledge  known  once  as  philology  without  an
understanding of the way philology engaged with a domain within its “womb”
that spoke of cultures of difference.
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The great philologist and Oriental scholar Eugène Burnouf offers an insight
into the way this philological prestige and pretense lived on in Oriental studies
in this 1823 description of translating a Sanskrit text: “It is more than India,
gentlemen, it is a page from the origins of the world, from the primitive history
of human species, that we shall attempt to decipher together” 50. With such a
strong romantic confirmation of the importance of this Oriental studies project,
albeit  one  still  anchored  in  origin,  the  absence  of  attention  to  this  field  in
Foucault seems puzzling. Yet, strangely and, almost despite itself, buried within
Burnouf’s own romantic phrasing lies the answer.
53
Instead of producing a dissonant new discourse, Burnouf’s “decipherment”
confirmed the power of an existing one. The methods of textual translation he
employed were now utterly dependent on the logic and reasoning of another
“language game,” namely, science. Here was a “logic” that, ten years hence and
in  the  completely  unrelated  field  of  colonial  engineering,  could  reverse
Burnouf’s high valuation of the East and go on to explain why West was best. It
was  a  reversal  summed up  in  the  words  of  Prosper  Enfantin:  “Suez  is  the
Centre of our life work. We shall carry out the act for which the world is waiting
to proclaim that we are male!”51.
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On  the  face  of  it,  Enfantin’s  assertion  of  Western  male  sexuality  and55
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Transforming Translation
Burnouf’s romantic quest for human origin may appear utterly unrelated. Yet
what they shared was a belief in the language, logic, and power that came from
different employments of the scientific method. It is this method that locates
them both, as Müller puts it, within the “highest mental culture.” Extraction,
translation,  mobility,  and an  ability  to  combine  with  and reconfigure  other
elements of an existing set of knowledges formed the methodological basis for
both these disparate discourses. And just as scientifically based translational
practices would render an exact knowledge of texts “from the origins of the
world,” so, too, the language of modern science, when applied to engineering
works,  would  refashion  the  ground  beneath  our  feet.  The  magnetic  pull  of
science was beginning to draw a vast array of “disciplines” into its orbit. Some,
as Foucault notes, would develop their own critical accents that would set them
apart. Others, however, such as those that were more immediately and directly
useful to the process of colonization, would be intellectually reduced, becoming
mere  foot  soldiers  of  observation.  Scientific  method,  therefore,  not  only
reshaped  the  ground  beneath  our  feet  but  also  the  mental  landscape  we
inhabited.  It  was  at  this  crucial  juncture,  a  point  at  which  this  essay  itself
returns to its opening theme of “science in action,” that Oriental studies would
both be born and cursed. In this subtle shift, which actually gave the field its
name, Oriental studies would no longer command an alternative possibility of
theoretical production but would instead be demoted to the rank of translator
and  supplier  of  observations  valuable  to  the  work  of  other  (disciplinary)
projects.  Moreover,  all  this  was taking place at  around the time translation
studies was reshaping its practices as a result of the magnetic pull of science.
Indeed,  these  epistemic  changes  would  pull  even  Burnouf’s  romantic
sentiments into the logic of scientific reason and, from there, highlight the one
remaining value Oriental studies had, relevance.
In classical times, what was essential in translation was not exactitude but
expropriation  to  enrich  one’s  own  language.  As  Saint  Jerome  put  it,  “The
translator considers thought content a prisoner which he transplants into his
own language with  the  prerogative  of  a  conqueror”52.  By  the  middle  of  the
eighteenth  century  the  revolution  taking  place  in  comparative  philology
changed  this  view.[22]  The  “original”  text  was  no  longer  a  prison  but  a
laboratory and the conqueror increasingly took on the guise of a scientist of
language.  While philology had abandoned studies of  the word for ones that
focused  on  the  structure  of  language,  translation  studies  rediscovered  the
importance of the word, albeit in a very different way. With word in hand, it
demanded of itself the impossible: a word-for-word translation, or as near as
one could get to that.[23] While philology had abandoned the search for origin,
translation,  in  a  very  different  way,  reinscribed  origin  in  the  privilege  it
accorded to the (original) text53. From the field of comparative philology, with
its  recently  acquired  concern  for  the  internal  grammars  and  structures  of
language,  came  a  translational  practice  that  similarly  concerned  itself  with
structure and detail. But the devil in this detail was a turning of the tables on
theology’s  search  for  truth  and  transparency  in  origin.  From  this  time  on,
translation studies looked forward to a time when the promise of a scientific
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knowledge  matrix  would  fulfill  its  dream  of  transparency.  Very  quickly,
however,  it  became  apparent  that  good  translation  required  more  than  a
word-for-word account. Words required “contextualization,” and it was Michel
Bréal (in his “Les idées latentes”, 189754) who would state this succinctly: “It
does not suffice at all, in order to give an account of a structure of a language, to
analyze its grammar and to trace the words back to their etymological values.
One must enter into the people’s way of thinking and feeling.”
It seems clear from this,  as Timothy Mitchell  intimates,  that philology, in
part at least, authorized not only the search for the nature of the human spirit
but, in the case of knowledges that spoke of material states of being (such as
Oriental  studies),  for  a  more  modest,  localized,  and applied  social  research
agenda. But why, one might begin to wonder, would this field that required
entering “into the people’s way of thinking and feeling” approach this as a need
for an applied,  almost area-studies social  research agenda? This question is
particularly apposite when one considers those other “splinters” of philological
thought  that  were  privileged  because  of  their  radically  different  and  quite
revolutionary notions of difference. These fields also would need to speak to the
question of “the people’s way of thinking and feeling,” but they would do so not
by reference to the surface appearance of things but by focusing instead on the
buried processes of signification on which such surfaces were laid. It is at this
point that we need to return to Foucault.
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Foucault points out that the new “grammars” of Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche
would build on the “dissonance” buried within Western knowledge of a certain
“otherness” of economy, consciousness,  and language. If  it  was indeed from
within  philology  that  such  dissonance  would  grow,  then  religious  methods
cannot be ignored. This is because these “new grammars” would all, in their
own  unique  ways,  gain  protean  strength  thanks  to  a  long  held  but  buried
commitment within philology to what we might now call an early “philosophy
of the dissonant sign.” In classical times, “nouns” and “verbs” would be read
beyond  their  literal  meaning  as  “signs”  through  which  one  could  trace  the
language and wonders of God.[24] It was just this attempt to reach beyond the
“manifest” level of surface appearance and touch an inner symbolic meaning
that would reemerge in a secular form and come to define these new grammars
of dissent.
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Freud’s work, for example, would produce a “dissonance” that spoke directly
to  “the  people’s  way  of  thinking  and feeling”  by  attempting  to  unmask  the
meaning of the “unspoken phrase.” In doing this, he would come to recognize
the value of past symbolic, religious, and “fanciful” interpretations of dreams
but would then pivot this question away from “dream content” operative at a
manifest  level  toward  the  latent  “thought-content”  that  lay  beneath  the
surface.[25] This approach required the disruption of the order of appearance
of phenomena within the dream, and led to an appreciation of compression,
substitution as well as concealment. For Freud, such unconscious forms would
often  manifest  themselves  in  the  gesture,  the  utterance,  or  the  slip  of  the
tongue. They would hint at an unconscious, repressed thought that could be
brought to the surface by his “talking cure.” Where Freud would look at the
internal grammar of the individual in his employment of otherness, Marx, if
Slavoj Žižek is to be believed, offered an account of the collective unconscious
of capitalism.[26] He would do this by pointing to the way that social change
was  orchestrated  within  capitalism  under  the  sign  of  the  “natural  laws  of
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production.” Such natural laws he would reveal as being little more than a form
of  repression that  would enable  exploitation to  appear  “natural.”  But  if  the
“unconscious”  of  these  “natural  laws”  could  be  disinterred,  they  would  be
shown to be anything but natural55.  Even in linguistics, this type of analysis
would  eventually  arise  once  the  inward  move  of  philology  was  halted  by  a
recognition that language itself was a social phenomenon. Language research
would return to social analysis with a recognition that language was a “social
event,” a “two-sided act,” as V. N. Voloshinov56 puts it. Thus, far from being
internal to itself, language was only explicable in terms of “dialogue.”
“Even an infant’s cry,” writes Voloshinov57, “is ‘oriented’ towards the mother”
and the growing recognition of this led away from the philological obsession
with reviving “cadavers of written languages.” As these “ancient monuments” of
the  “finished  monologic  utterance”  gave  way  to  a  focus  on  lived  verbal
utterances58, a second shift began to take place. In this post-Saussurian world,
emphasis would be redirected to the multitude of ways in which dialogue would
be inflected. Stylization, parody, staz, and dialogue were the devices employed
by  Mikhail  Bakhtin  when  he  set  about  to  determine  many  of  the  verbal
“postures,” accents, and subtexts that could transform a remark into a sign of
joyousness, anger, interrogation, and so on.[27] In other words, one begins to
recognize that  the “philosophy of  language is  the philosophy of  the sign”59;
herein lay the beginnings of Marxist semiotics.
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Thus,  in  altogether  different  ways  (words/signs,  conscious/unconscious,
economy/political  economy),  these  types  of  “latent”  analyses  differed  from
“manifest”  understandings of  how one “must enter into the people’s  way of
thinking and feeling.”
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To gain such entry, these “dissonant” discourses employed a kind of internal
“otherness”  to  produce  a  “distanciation  effect”  with  regard  to  prevailing
knowledge  forms,  and  it  was  this  that  created  the  “otherness”  of  which
Foucault speaks. Yet when it came to the very domain where “otherness” took
on  a  lived  material  form  (Oriental  studies),  the  result  was  intellectual
impoverishment  brought  on  by  an  applied  research  agenda  that  operated
almost entirely on a “manifest” level, one reinforced by a view of language itself
as only a “tool.” In this domain, “the people’s way of thinking and feeling” was
only  registered  by  surface  description  and  only  uncovered  at  the  level  of
applied,  descriptive  research  using  the  skills  acquired  in  applied  language
study.
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It  was  this  shift  of  focus  away  from  questions  about  ontological  and
theological matters to ones concerned with surface description that led to the
“demotion” of Oriental studies from its once privileged place within philology.
Moreover, and it was this trajectory that would then form the contours along
which area  studies’  “way of  knowing”  would  eventually  travel.  The  applied,
descriptive quality of Asian area studies was, therefore, not simply an effect of
Cold War functionalism or a shift from the humanities to the social sciences,
although,  to  be  fair,  these  things  would  highlight  and  lay  bare  the  politics
behind  the  sign,  “Europe  and  its  other,”  under  which  Asian  area  studies
labored.  In effect,  however,  the field had already been theoretically laid out
long before it was “named.” As Oriental studies was demoted, the field opened
itself to an area-studies way of knowing. At the time it looked like anything but
a demotion.
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One  finds  that  by  the  late  nineteenth  century  the  expansion  and64
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formalization of  colonial  governance had put  Oriental  studies  knowledge in
great demand. And while this would lead romantics like Schlegel to remark
sarcastically that India, with the help of Oriental scholars, had become little
more than “England’s milch cow” 60,  such critiques were themselves, by this
stage, little short of laughable. They mattered little in the face of a field that was
both an urgent  political  necessity  and could claim to  employ the  “scientific
method”  of  the  “highest  mental  culture.”  Besides,  there  was  also  the  other
undeniable  fact  that  this  utilitarian  attitude  produced  the  milk  of  colonial
knowledge on which Oriental studies would feed and grow.[28]
While  one cannot  deny that  specific  knowledge would be  gained through
such involvement with government, one should not forget that the most valued
form this knowledge would take was always one that could be interpolated into
the machinery of colonial government. Here was a display of power/knowledge
that, more than anything, demonstrated the “tamed” nature of what could, in
theory at least, have been a disruptive domain of knowledge. Intoxicated by its
proximity  to  colonial  power  and  legitimized  by  its  functional  use-value,
Oriental studies, far from disturbing the grammar of colonial thinking, became
utterly  complicit  with  it.  Far  from  “disturbing  the  words  we  speak”61,  it
“translated” those disturbances into words that revealed the “truth” not only of
India but, more important, of Western “homogeneous,” “scientific” reasoning.
Yet  the  more  it  reified  Western  reason  as  the  organizing  trope  of  its
understanding of the non-Western world, the more it was forced to accept and
employ the “objective” and “rigorous” language of scientific understanding that
killed  off  the  possibilities  of  expressing,  even  partly,  the  order  of  other
cosmologies.  The  more  such  an  understanding  offered  to  governments  and
missionaries in terms of the functional knowledge value, the more the field split
into “functional” subfields that spoke of specific country-based knowledges. As
it  did  this,  it  further  eroded  its  own  status  as  an  independent  domain  of
knowledge that could speak to the essence of things. In heading down this path,
Oriental studies not only squandered its potential to speak in its own tongue
and  produce  dissonance  within  Western  reason,  but,  in  exchange  for  what
intellectually, at least, were the meager privileges that would accrue from its
status as colonial translator, it opened the door to its own demise at the hands
of social sciences, for they would prove to be far more adept at speaking the
“objective” language of science. At the time, however, this intellectual demise of
Oriental studies appeared to contradict “the facts.”
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Oriental studies emerged as a discrete domain at the very moment when the
sciences  themselves  had  begun  to  value  the  methodology  of  “systematic
observation” and the so-called empirical style. By the nineteenth century, this
methodology  was  increasingly  finding  a  privileged  reception  within  social
inquiry,  and the fact that Oriental  studies dealt  with “real  places” and “real
things” by employing applied techniques and translations made its empirical
observations a model form of applied knowledge. Yet in this claim to its own
scientificity Oriental studies would once again begin to falter.
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By the turn of the nineteenth century, the way descriptive knowledge was
viewed had changed dramatically. Earlier statistical analysis had been treated
with  immense  skepticism within  the  nascent  social  sciences  because  of  the
problem of “like species,”[29] but by the beginning of the twentieth century,
this was no longer the case.  Francis Galton’s work in anthropology,  Francis
Ysidro  Edgeworth’s  in  economics  and  Karl  Pearson’s  in  the  philosophy  of
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Asian Studies
science had begun to produce the type of statistical methodologies that were
about to claim their own privileged status as the most “objective” approaches to
questions of the social sciences. In effect, this quantitative methodology had
already started to erode the more culturally based descriptive approaches at the
heart of Oriental studies.[30] As these ideas spread into the social sciences,
observational  knowledge  would  no  longer  be  the  basis  on  which  a  model
discipline would be built.  Instead, such knowledge would be treated as little
more than the raw data awaiting scientific systematization and quantification.
Wedded as  it  was to  observational  methods,  Oriental  studies  was quickly
becoming little more than a “content provider” for social scientific studies of
other cultures. Long gone were the days when Oriental studies was an exalted
domain from which one spoke to the essence of things; and squandered were
the chances it had of achieving its potential as a site of disruption. Instead, the
applied research programs of Oriental studies were increasingly dependent on
the theories and scientific practices of other domains of Western knowledge. It
was this trajectory that would simultaneously damn this domain intellectually
and empower it politically. Thus, while Oriental studies was evacuated of any
pretensions to theoretical critique, the one remaining “compensation” offered
to this field lay in the claims it could now make to know “native” peoples and
languages. Its one distinctive claim thus rested on its applied language training.
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Curiously, then, this field that would speak directly to questions of material
otherness and difference was never to be theoretically charged or privileged but
was instead transformed into a mere domain of application and observation.
Thus, while other protégés of philology would achieve exalted status and come
to disturb the words we speak and the grammatical habits through which we
think (Foucault), the applied nature of Oriental studies found itself increasingly
reliant  on  the  language  and  grammar  of  science  to  provide  it  with  a
translational key. Lashed firmly to this pole of Western scientific reason, the
potentially radical, disruptive, and “heterogeneous” possibilities this field had
to offer, if differently conceived, were brought meekly to heel as it became one
more brick in the wall around the “homogeneous” world of reason. It was this
“style of thought” that would offer Oriental studies its one remaining significant
compensation: relevance. And this would go on to define Asian area studies.
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The renunciation by Oriental studies to grand universalizing claims and the
birth of a new form of geographically specific knowledge about texts and society
—which was later to take the name Asian studies—was brought on by neither a
great revolutionary discovery nor a grand methodological shift within the field
itself. Instead, the field was slowly transformed as it drew on the social sciences
and began to produce work of  definite  utilitarian value to missionaries  and
colonial administrators. The increased productivity of translational practices,
brought on through the use of new scientific techniques,  also furthered this
process and reinforced the awe with which scientific method was viewed. In the
past,  scarce  textual  evidence  had  been  “supplemented”  by  individual
imagination and creative fancy. With increased translation skills more material
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was rendered into Western languages and this, along with the high value now
placed on observation, made imaginative leaps simply unimaginable. Instead of
textual  scarcity  there  was  now  abundance,  and  this,  in  turn,  increased  the
tendency to specialize. Where once “the Orient” could be treated as a single
object  of  scholarly  inquiry,  it  was  now  far  too  big  and  complex  for  such
simplicities. As I have already noted, specialized subdisciplines would emerge,
and these would cluster around the languages studied. The resulting subfields
—sinology,  Egyptology,  Indic  studies,  and  so  forth—reinforced  an  already
existing trend to organize knowledge around country as well as “culture,” and
this,  in  turn,  furthered  the  functionality  of  these  fields.  Even  within  these
sub-fields, the sheer density of knowledge that was emerging, coupled with the
demand by government, business, and a range of other lobbies for this field to
produce functional knowledge, meant that they were constantly being pulled
into the orbit of various disciplines. These factors in turn reinforced the split
between “real” as “place” of description covered by an area study and “thought”
as scientific knowledge based in or on a discipline.
Somewhat  later,  and  in  the  United  States,  these  trends  would  finally
“express”  what  had long been imminent.  By forcing a  move away from the
humanities  and highlighting utilitarian value  above  all  else,  what  ended up
being produced was what one scholar has termed a “North American way of
knowing”62. This would clear the field of its remaining romanticism and lead to
a combination of language training and training in social science disciplinary
skills. By the late twenties the Library of Congress had begun to reorganize its
collection into geographically specific domains,[31] and private organizations,
such as the Carnegie Institute, were beginning to fund scholarly fieldwork that
employed the new “interdisciplinary” social science methodologies in the study
of specific non-Western societies. While the projects they funded and endorsed
were still  based on an examination of  past great civilizations,  and therefore
bore the hallmarks of Oriental studies, the methods being deployed betrayed
the now almost complete dominance of the social sciences and offered “telltale
signs” of things to come.[32] The arrival of “area studies” would not take long.
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These trends would reach their apogee in the changed geopolitical climate
that followed the Second World War, but they were already clearly imminent
within Oriental studies. Thus, while Ruth Benedict’s anthropological study of
interned Japanese Americans, commissioned as part of the war effort against
Japan,  marked  one  of  the  first  moments  of  this  new field  of  “applied  area
studies,” it was in fact not a break but the culmination of a long trend. Yet it
was also a template of things that followed. Here was a type of scholarship that
was  contemporary  and  country  based  and,  most  important  of  all,  had
immediate policy dividends. Here was a type of scholarship that would inspire
an entire generation of utilitarian Cold War area studies scholars. By the late
1940s the applied models of the social sciences had begun to cast a shadow
over  the  entire  intellectual  horizon.  Increasingly,  and  much  more  explicitly
than in the past, the new field of area studies would turn to the social sciences
for  explanations  of  global  developments,  for  in  these,  it  was  hoped,  a  way
would be found to counter the universalizing Marxist revolutionary accounts of
development.[33]  The  politics  of  the  field  was  now  overt,  and  “friend  and
enemy” was more than a trope, it policed boundaries of scholarly acceptability.
This part  of  the story of  Asian area studies—when area studies becomes an
overt weapon of the Cold War—is well-known, as is the later “insurgency”63 of
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left scholars attached to or associated with the Committee of Concerned Asian
Scholars.[34] The overt politicization of this field is not what concerns me here.
What  does  is  the  limited  and  limiting  notion  of  what  area  studies  can  do
intellectually. And that, I have argued, was a battle that was lost even before the
invention of area studies knowledges.
With language as its only definable core—and, even here, the employment of
language only as a domain to train in “application”—it is little wonder that the
field now lacks any sense of its own intellectual identity. Yet, as is clear from
other domains,  language offers  a  range of  other more intellectually  exciting
possibilities. To break the atheoretical cycle of area studies, yet recognize its
core, therefore requires circling back to that moment of language “dissonance”
that Foucault identified. It necessitates turning away from the temptation to
regard itself only as a content provider for the disciplines and to take more
seriously and develop theoretically the study of its core, language. This time,
however, language study would not be undertaken purely in order to improve
“fluency”  or  simply  for  “application”  but  in  order  to  create  a  means  of
producing intellectual  “dissonance.”  It  would become a means by which we
could start to take cultural difference and the signs of such difference seriously.
To do this, we need to return to those moments when philology gave birth to
the language of dissent and realize that the moves that enabled Freud, Marx,
and Nietzsche to speak in dissonance are historically and intellectually also a
possibility for area studies.
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To arrive back at that moment,  to treat it  not historically as the moment
when Oriental studies began its slippage into area studies, but theoretically, as
a moment of decision about which knowledge form this nascent domain should
take,  brings  us  back  to  the  question  of  language  theoretically.  Here,  the
trajectory for the study of language is quite different from the training role it is
currently ascribed.  Here,  it  departs from these strictures to suggest a social
semiotics that would begin to highlight the connotative possibilities inherent in
language itself. Here is one way to unearth latent meaning and heterogeneous
forms. It is a means of translating that can give voice to the murmurs of other
cosmologies. Perhaps this way the Chinese dyke builders will have their day,
not as part of the scientific world of incorporation but as a tale of otherness,
difference, and dissent that lets us call into question the epistemic violence of
scientific incorporation.
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I would like to thank the Australian Research Council for funding this research and the
Max Planck Institute  for  History  in  Göttingen,  Germany,  where  I  revised this  piece
during a month-long sabbatical.
[1]. I first took notice of this story when I heard it as an aside in a talk by a prominent
historian  of  Chinese  science,  who  was  explaining  the  sophistication  of  Chinese
dyke-making techniques. The story of ceremony was very much given as light relief, and
when the account of the dykes was published, the story of the archers was omitted. It is
still,  however, very much in the consciousness of the people of Zhejiang. In a recent
commentary on the topic, Ye Bingnan retells the story of King Qian and the shooting of
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arrows. King Qian was head of a small state in the five dynasties period, which lasted
from 825 to 932 a.d. Ye’s64 commentary is as follows:
Concerning Qian’s repairs of the seawalls to prevent calamities during the Yangtze River
tide, there is a folk tale about “King Qian shooting the waves” [钱王射潮]. The story of
Qian comes to us from a portrayal in the “Record of the Shooting of the Tides” [射潮记],
written by Qian’s third generation offspring, Sun Qian Weiyan. It is said of the early
days of establishing the dyke that it took place in the eighth month, at a time of high
tides and seasonal flooding. The raging tide and pounding swirl made it impossible to
carry out construction work. Qian therefore ordered and led the deployment of soldiers
to the site. From the hillsides down to the southern side of the mountain sturdy bamboo
trees were made into three thousand arrows by woodworkers. These arrows were then
adorned with the feathers of various birds, and painted with a fiery red coloration, and
newly fired metal was used to make the arrow tips. Five hundred soldiers who had the
skill and strength to fire the crossbow were assembled at the banks of the Yangtze River
and each archer was given six arrows. Each time there was a tidal rush, they would fire
one arrow into the raging torrent. It was in this way that, after they had fired five times,
they unexpectedly forced the tide to turn away from Hangzhou Bay and they made these
eastern tides turn toward the western hills. It is said of these five hundred archers that
they  are  all  buried  together  at  Pubing  [浦兵],  an  area  between  Houchaomen  and
Tongjiangmen. Above the ground in which they lay, a memorial was erected to them in a
place called Tiezhuangpu. In Hangzhou’s Jianggan district; even to this day, there are
still two lane-ways bearing the names “the horizontal arrow lane-way” [横箭道巷] and
the “vertical arrow lane-way” [直箭道巷]. It is said that these names are related to the
story of King Qian and the shooting of the tide.
[2]. For a very different “take” on a similar event, see Michel de Certeau’s opening lines
in The Writing of History. De Certeau begins this work by examining the etching by Jan
van der Straet of Amerigo Vespucci’s “discovery” of native Americans (they were not
known before?)  in  the  New World.  It  is  with  this  encounter  with the  other  that  de
Certeau begins his examination of Western writing as historical practice65.
[3]. T-O maps were popular in Christendom from about the seventh to ninth centuries
until the mid-1300s. They were highly symbolic, being circular in shape and dividing the
world into three parts to form a T, at whose center was the holy city of Jerusalem.
[4].  After  its  erection  the  artists  objected:  “We  come,  writers,  painters,  sculpters,
architects...in the name of French art and history that are both threatened, to protest
against the erection in the very heart of our capital of the needless and monstrous Eiffel
Tower”  (Louis  Chéronnet66).  Guy  de  Maupassant,  claims  Roland  Barthes67,  “often
lunched at the restaurant in the tower, though he didn’t much care for the food: ‘It’s the
only place in Paris,’ he used to say, ‘where I don’t have to see it.’” Despite these early
artistic objections to the structural aesthetics of the tower, it was later hailed because it
offered  “the  fundamental  aesthetic  experience  of  today’s  buildings”68  .  As  Walter
Benjamin elsewhere said,  it  was an “incomparable” monument to the “heroic age of
technology”69.  Susan  Buck-Morss  notes  that  Benjamin  believed  that  the  artists,  in
attempting to defend themselves against the perceived threat of this new technology,
missed the real danger, namely, the shopwindow where the display of art was “in the
service of the salesman”70.
[5].  Indeed,  according  to  Umberto  Eco71,  one  motive  for  the  English  search  for  a
universal language key was that it would facilitate trade.
[6]. Little wonder that two of the most famous critics of rational choice theory from
within that logic, David Green and Ian Shapiro, have pointed out that the only reason
such modeling could be regarded as rigorous and universally applicable was because the
models  could  never  actually  be  falsified!  All  rational  choice  does,  they  claim,  is
reconfigure existing empirical knowledge into rational choice forms. For that reason,
they  conclude  that  rational  choice  theory  has  contributed  “virtually  nothing  to  the
empirical study of politics”72. For an excellent and succinct summary of the debate see
Brogan73.
[7]. Recent German scholarship on China challenges the philological roots of Chinese
studies. For my argument, however, the veracity of this history is not the issue. Rather, I
am interested in the effects of the belief in this past, irrespective of whether it is a post
factum rationalization or not. For the controversial argument suggesting that German
Chinese studies is not philological, see Leutner74 (thanks to Peter Mereker for guiding
me through this).
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[8]. Pierre Ryckmans (Simon Leys)75, for example, has argued that “the sinological field
is defined linguistically.” More recently, Vicente L. Rafael76  has defined the whole of
area studies as “ensembles of knowledges and practices grounded on specific linguistic
competencies and formulated within, as well as across, disciplinary boundaries.”
[9].  In  the case  of  Chinese studies,  at  least,  this  was reinforced by the gaozhen (or
K’aocheng) approach to knowledge that emerged in the late Qing dynasty and stressed
“facts” and philology. See Elman77.
[10]. Barthes’s famous example of denotative meaning—“Here’s a black soldier saluting
the French flag”—was deepened with a recognition of its “symbolic” connotative intent,
which in this case suggested a mixture of colonialist nationalism and militarism. For an
investigation of this linguistic link see Coward and Ellis78.
[11]. Note, for instance, Luther’s remark on Adam: “What an ocean of knowledge and
wisdom there was in this one man!” See Aarsleff79.
For Locke, of course, such a “trick” was unavoidable, and my use of the term here is
therefore  ironic.  Locke saw words as  signs of  ideas  and language itself  as  a  human
invention. Words had no core that tied them back to objects any more than languages
were divinely inspired. The whole idea of a search for an original universal language
was,  therefore,  for  Locke,  a  complete  misunderstanding of  the  nature  of  words  and
language. For more details on Locke see Aarsleff80.
[12]. While some have regarded Enoch as “the scribe” and therefore become interested
in  the  language  in  which  he  wrote,  Augustine  believed  that  Enoch,  the  seventh
generation from Adam, was simply too ancient to be a reliable witness, and that his
book therefore could not be included in the ecclesiastical canon, for false things may
have been inserted in it. I wish to thank Allen Kerkeslager (Department of Theology, St.
Josephs University, Philadelphia) for his help in positioning Enoch in this debate.
Aarsleff81  offers this comment on Adamicism in relation to Foucault’s reading in the
Order  of  Things,  which he  finds  too  simplistic  and secular.  Louis  Marin82  similarly
critiques the lack of the religious in that work.
[13]. Hebrew was central to this quest, as the early fathers of the Church attest. Saint
Jerome, in one of his epistles to Damascus, wrote that “the whole of antiquity affirms
that Hebrew, in which the Old Testament was written, was the beginning of human
speech”83. Origen, in his eleventh homily on the Book of Numbers, expresses his belief
that Hebrew, originally given by Adam, remained in that part of the world which was the
chosen portion of God, rather than being left, like the rest of the world, to one of his
angels. For further details and claims to this effect see Müller84.
[14]. Webb’s words were as follows: “Scripture Teacheth, that the whole Earth was of
one Language until the Conspiracy at Babel; History informs us that China was peopled,
whilst the Earth was so of one Language, and before that Conspiracy. Scripture teacheth
that the Judgment of Confusion of Tongues, fell upon those only that were at Babel;
History  informs,  that  the  Chinois  being  fully  settled  before,  were  not  there:  And
moreover that the same Language and Characters which long preceding that confusion
they used, are in use with them at this very Day.”85
[15].  So  diverse  was  the  philological  community  that  even  in  1804  the  Manchester
Philological  Society  was  able  to  exclude from its  membership  anyone who spoke of
Sanskrit or Indo-European languages and doubted the divine revelations. Moreover, it
was  not  until  1866  that  the  Société  de  Linguistique  of  Paris  stopped  accepting
communication on the question of a universal language86.
[16].  See Müller87  for the substantive point.  It  should be noted, however,  that while
Müller attributes the terms Indo-German and Indo-European to Schlegel88, the former
term is more readily identified with J. von Klaproth, while the latter is attributed to T.
Young.
[17]. While Schlegel’s work inspired the new comparativism, it was Francis Bopp who
published the first detailed comparative text in 1816. See Müller89.
[18]. Or, at the very least, when an emphasis on the word did return, as it would in V. N.
Voloshinov’s  post-Saussurian “dialogical”  approach,  it  would take Leibniz’s  idea of  a
“universal grammar” in a very different direction. No longer interested in etymological
paths back to God, Voloshinov “demotes” the word to being merely the “purest,” most
universal and “neutral” of “signs” within any verbal process of communication. With a
focus on the signification processes, rather than on the origin of words, Voloshinov90
revalorizes the word but does so on a new basis: “The entire reality of the word is wholly
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absorbed in its function of being a sign,” he stated, thereby offering what would become
the beginnings of a Marxist semiology.
[19]. Müller91 made his view on this point quite clear: “I believe there is no science from
which  we,  the  students  of  language,  may  learn  more  than  from  Geology.  Now,  in
Geology, if we have once acquired a general knowledge of the successive strata that form
the crust of the earth and of the faunas and floras present or absent in each, nothing is
so instructive as the minute exploration of a quarry close at hand, of a cave or a mine, in
order to see things with our own eyes, to handle them, and to learn how every pebble
that we pick up points a lesson of the widest range. I believe the same is true of the
science of language.”
[20].  Foucault92.  His reading of  the effects of  comparative philology is  found in the
chapter “Labor, Life, Language,” and it is here that one will find the specific references
to which I refer.
[21]. For signposts to these appropriations see Schwab93; and Maverick94.
[22].  The history of translation is long and complex and varies from one country to
another.  Briefly,  within  English  translation  studies  at  least  two  different  positions
prevailed.  From  the  seventeenth  century  one  notes  the  rise  of  “transparency”  and
fluency  (or  what  Lawrence  Venuti  labels  “domestication”)  as  considerations  in
translation. The other approach is much more literal, that is to say, it retains a certain
textual  fidelity  that  produced  awkwardness  and  a  certain  foreignness  in  the  text
translated. For more details on this debate see Venuti95.
[23].  One sees  the  contemporary effects  of  this  translational  method in  the  defense
mounted  by  area  studies  against  “alien”  Western  theory.  Note  for  instance,  the
argument proffered by Paul Cohen96 for a China-centric approach:
[The] China-centred approach is intended to delineate an approach to recent Chinese
history that strives to understand what is happening in that history in terms that are as
free as possible of imported criteria of significance....
...it will be countered, as long as the practitioners of China-centred historiography are
Americans, no matter how hard we try to get “inside” Chinese history, we will still end
up insinuating into this history vocabulary and concepts that are American. Outsiders
can never really develop an insider perspective.... This is true—up to a point.
[24].  Even  ostensibly  secular  readings  of  grammar,  such  as  those  offered  by  the
Port-Royal logicians in the seventeenth century, when more closely scrutinized, turned
out to be thoroughly imbued with Christian metaphoricity. As Marin97 points out, the
eucharistic  model  reveals  “the  profound  coherence  of  the  network  of  examples
illustrating  the  semiotic  theory  of  Port-Royal.”  Here  is  a  theory  of  speech  that
“simultaneously” develops “a linguistic theology of the Eucharist.”
[25].  While  recognizing  the  limitations  of  past  (largely  biblical)  interpretations  of
dreams, Freud was still quite clear about their value. In examining the dream books of
old  he  stated  that  they  should  not  be  dismissed  in  their  entirety,  for  they  offer  an
example of “one of those not infrequent cases where ancient and stubbornly retained
popular belief seems to have come nearer to the truth of the matter than the opinion of
modern science”98.
[26]. Žižek99 goes so far as to suggest that there is a “fundamental homology between
the interpretative procedure of Marx and Freud—more precisely, between their analysis
of commodity and of dreams.”
[27].  Skaz  is  a  Russian expression with  no English  equivalent  that  is  probably  best
described as “narration with marked speech-event features.” See Titunik100 1973, 191 n.
19. Here, of course, I am merely rehearsing the “dialogistic” thinking of Mikhail Bakhtin
and repeating the point about the “utterance” he makes most forcefully in Baxtin101. It
should be noted that  this  point also plays a key role in that  classic  Bahktin text  on
language, enigmatically authored by either a close follower or by Bakhtin himself under
the alter ego identity of V. N. Voloshinov102. See especially part 2, chapters 2 and 3, of
the Voloshinov text.
[28]. Who could forget, after all, that the first Western school for the study of Sanskrit
was opened by the British East India Company in Hailsbury College in 1805, or that
Warren Hastings’s plan of 1772 for better governance in Bengal ended up turning on the
teaching of Sanskrit as a means to establish a pure “Hindu law.” For further details on
this see Cohn103.
Lead Us Not into Translation: Notes Toward a Theoretical Foundation for Asian Studies
http://transtexts.revues.org/458
Notes
1  Georges Bataille, “The Psychological Structure of Fascism”, New German Critique,
n°16, 1979, pp. 64–87.
2 Ibid., p. 65.
3  Bruno Latour, Science in Action, London, Open University Press, 1987, p. 215.
4  Ibid., p. 216.
5   Walter  D.  Mignolo,  “Misunderstanding and Colonization:  The Reconfiguration of
Memory and Space”, South Atlantic Quarterly, n° 92, 1993, pp. 221-222.
6  Michel  de Certeau,  The Practice  of  Everyday Life,  translated by Steven Rendall,
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984, p. 121.
7  Ibid., p. 120.
8  Bruno Latour, Science in Action, London, Open University Press, 1987, p. 221.
9  Timothy Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p.
6.
10  C. R. Fay, Palace of Industry, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1951, p. 88.
11  Timothy Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p.
1.
12   Bruce  Cumings,  “Seeing  Like  an  Area  Specialist”,  in  Masao  Miyoshi  and  Harry
Harootunian (dir.), Learning Places: Area Studies, Colonial, Cultural, Ethnic Studies,
and Received Disciplines, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2002.
13  Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, translated by David Wills, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1995, p. 21.
14   Robert  H.  Bates,  “Letter  from  the  President:  Area  Studies  and  the  Discipline”,
APSA–CP (newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics), n°7.1,
[29]. Note Stephen Stigler’s104 words on the problem of like-species within statistical
analysis:  “Even  as  late  as  1869 it  was  necessary  for  the  economist  William Stanley
Jevons to defend his employment of statistics against the charges that he was wrong to
combine  prices  of  several  very  different  commodities  into  one  index  in  a  study  of
variation in the value of gold.”
[30]. On this importance of science as a “trope” see Latour105. On the rather slow spread
of the statistical method to the social sciences see Stigler106.
[31].  In  1928 the  Chinese-language  books  in  the  Library  of  Congress  were  the  first
holdings  to  be  gathered  together  and  housed  in  the  newly  constituted  “Division  of
Chinese Literature,” and this would be the model used to reorganize all  other Asian
language holdings. The Japanese collection would be rearranged sometime after 1930,
and in 1938 the Indian collection would begin to be housed in a separate section that
became, after 1942, the Indic Studies section of the library’s Asian Division. See Library
of Congress107. Thanks to Mi Chu of the Library of Congress for pointing out to me this
process of library rearrangement.
[32].  Dipesh  Chakrabarty  notes  that  the  first  such  program  undertaken  under  the
auspices of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) was a study of Mayan culture,
which brought together archaeologists, ethnologists, historians, geographers, biologists,
nutritionists, medical research workers, and other types of specialists; Chakarabarty108;
citing Stewart109.
[33]. For examples of this in relation to China see Barlow110.
[34].  So  one  finds  that  in  the  postwar  era  in  Chinese  studies  (like  many  other
non-Western  areas)  the  struggle  was  said  to  have  taken  place  between  the
modernization “paradigm” and a more revolutionary outlook. For a critique of what in
some respects  foreshadows  Cohen’s  work  arguing  for  a  China-centric  approach,  see
Myers and Metzer111.  For a critique that argues for the need for greater (not lesser)
theoretical  rigor,  see Johnson112;  yet  even here,  while  theoretical  rigor  is  said to  be
needed  to  sharpen  our  focus,  what  is  meant  by  theory  is  little  more  than  stronger
reading glasses for the social translator.
Lead Us Not into Translation: Notes Toward a Theoretical Foundation for Asian Studies
http://transtexts.revues.org/458
1996, p. 2.
15   David  E.  Mungello,  Curious  Land:  Jesuit  Accommodation  and  the  Origins  of
Sinology, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 1985, p. 135.
16  Paul Cohen, Discovering History in China,New York, Columbia University Press,
1984.
17  Maurice Olender, The Languages of Paradise: Race, Religion, and Philology in the
Nineteenth Century, translated by Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1992, p. 52.
18  Roman Jakobson, “On Linguistic Aspects of Translation”, in Schulte and Biguenet
(dir.), Theories of Translation: An Anthology of Essays from Dryden to Derrida, 1992.
19  Tejaswini Niranjana, Siting Translation,  Berkeley, University of California Press,
1992.
20   Walter  D.  Mignolo  and  Freya  Schiwy,  “Translation/Transculturation  and  the
Colonial Difference”, in Elizabeth Boyi,  Beyond Dichotomies,  Syracuse, NY, Syracuse
University Press, 2001.
21  Raymond Schwab, The Oriental Renaissance: Europe’s Rediscovery of India and
the East,  1680–1880,  translated by Gene Patterson-Black and Victor  Reinking,  New
York, Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 15.
22  Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, translated by Gayatri Spivak, Baltimore, MD,
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, p. 75.
23  Fredrick Bodmer, The Loom of Language. London, George Allen and Unwin, 1944,
p. 444.
24   David  E.  Mungello,  Curious  Land:  Jesuit  Accommodation  and  the  Origins  of
Sinology, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 1985, pp. 134-164.
25  John Webb, An Historical Essay Endeavouring a Probability That the Language of
the Empire of China Is the Primitive Language, London, Printed for N. Brook, 1669.
26   David  E.  Mungello,  Curious  Land:  Jesuit  Accommodation  and  the  Origins  of
Sinology, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 1985, p. 35.
27  Maurice Olender, The Languages of Paradise: Race, Religion, and Philology in the
Nineteenth Century, translated by Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1992, p. 21.
28 Ibid., p. 22.
29   David  E.  Mungello,  Curious  Land:  Jesuit  Accommodation  and  the  Origins  of
Sinology, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 1985, p. 39.
30  Umberto Eco, The Search for the Perfect Language, translated by James Fentress,
Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, p. 49.
31  Ibid., p. 60 and p. 69.
32  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism, London, Verso, 1983, pp. 24-25.
33  Ibid., p. 194.
34  Fredrick Bodmer, The Loom of Language, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1944,
pp. 443-444.
35  Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History, translated by Tom Conley, New York,
Columbia University Press, 1988, p. 74.
36  Maurice Olender, The Languages of Paradise: Race, Religion, and Philology in the
Nineteenth Century, translated by Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1992, p. 77.
37  Umberto Eco, The Search for the Perfect Language, Translated by James Fentress,
Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, p. 86.
38  Ibid., p. 85.
39  Maurice Olender, Ibid., p. 7.
40  Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, translated by Wade Baskin,
London, Peter Owen, 1959, p. 2.
Lead Us Not into Translation: Notes Toward a Theoretical Foundation for Asian Studies
http://transtexts.revues.org/458
41   Holger  Pedersen,  The Discovery  of  Language,  Bloomington,  Indiana  University
Press, 1931, p. 18.
42  Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences,New
York, Vintage, 1970, p. 292.
43  Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, Vol. 1, London, Longman Green,
Longman and Roberts, 1861, pp. 21-22.
44  Hans Aarsleff,  From Locke to Saussure: Essays on the Study of Language and
Intellectual History, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1982, p. 32.
45  Holger  Pedersen,  The Discovery of  Language,  Bloomington,  Indiana University
Press, 1931, p. 19.
46  Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, Vol. 1, London, Longman Green,
Longman and Roberts, 1861, p. 118.
47  Ibid.
48  Heinrich Meier,  The Lesson of  Carl  Schmitt:  Four Chapters  on the  Distinction
between Political Theology and Political Philosophy,  translated by Marcus Brainard,
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 60.
49  Paul Rabinow, French Modern, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1989, p. 8.
50  Raymond Schwab, The Oriental Renaissance: Europe’s Rediscovery of India and
the East,  1680–1880,  translated by Gene Patterson-Black and Victor  Reinking,  New
York, Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 24.
51  A. Abdel-Malek, Idéologie et renaissance nationale : l'Égypte moderne, 2e édition,
Paris, Anthropos, 1969, pp. 189-198.
Martin Bernal, The Fabrication of Ancient Greece, 1785–1985, Vol. 1 of Black Athena:
The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization. New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University
Press, 1987, p. 269.
52  Hugo Friedrich, “On the Art of Translation”, Translated by Rainer Schulte and John
Biguenet,  in  Schulte  and Biguenet  (dir.),  Theories  of  Translation:  An Anthology of
Essays from Dryden to Derrida, 1992, pp. 12-13.
53  Rainer Schulte and John Biguenet (dir.), Theories of Translation: An Anthology of
Essays from Dryden to Derrida,Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 3.
54  Timothy Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988,
p. 141.
55  Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, London, Penguin, 1976, p 899.
56   V.  N.  Voloshinov,  Marxism  and  the  Philosophy  of  Language,  Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 84 and p. 94.
57  Ibid., p. 87.
58  Ibid., p. 72.
59  Ibid., p. 3.
60  Raymond Schwab, The Oriental Renaissance: Europe’s Rediscovery of India and
the East,  1680–1880,  translated by Gene Patterson-Black and Victor  Reinking,  New
York, Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 88.
61  Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences,New
York, Vintage, 1970, p. 298.
62  Vicente L. Rafael, “The Cultures of Area Studies in the United States”, Social Text,
n°41, 1994, p. 91.
Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Reconstructing Liberalism? Notes toward a Conversation between
Area Studies and Diasporic Studies”, Public Culture, n°10, 1998, pp. 457–481.
63  Tani E. Barlow, “Colonialism’s Career in Postwar China Studies”, Positions, vol. I,
1993, pp. 224-67.
64  Ye Bingnan, It Is Said That in Zhejiang: A Selection of Literary and Historical
Documents from Zhejiang, Vol. 54, Editorial Board of the Zhejiang Provincial Political
Consultative Conference, literary and historical materials, Zhejiang, Zhejiang People’s
Publishing House, 1993, p. 23.
Lead Us Not into Translation: Notes Toward a Theoretical Foundation for Asian Studies
http://transtexts.revues.org/458
65  Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History, Translated by Tom Conley, New York,
Columbia University Press, 1988, pp. xxv-xxvii.
66   Susan  Buck-Morss,  The  Dialects  of  Seeing:Walter  Benjamin  and  the  Arcades
Project, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1991, p. 131.
67  Roland Barthes, “Eiffel Tower”, in Susan Sontag (dir.), A Barthes Reader, New York,
Hill and Wang, 1983, p. 236.
68  Sigfried Giedion, Bauen in Frankreich: Eisen, Eisenbeton, Leipzig, Klinkhardt and
Biermann, 1926, p. 7.
Walter  Benjamin,  “N [Theoretics  of  Knowledge;  Theory  of  Progress]”,  Philosophical
Forum, n°15, 1983-1984, p. 3.
69   Susan  Buck-Morss,  The  Dialects  of  Seeing:Walter  Benjamin  and  the  Arcades
Project, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1991, p. 130.
70  Ibid., p. 134.
71  Umberto Eco, The Search for the Perfect Language, Translated by James Fentress,
Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, p. 209.
72   Donald  P.,  Green  and  Ian  Shapiro,  Pathologies  of  Rational  Choice  Theory:  A
Critique of  Applications in Political  Science,  New Haven,  CT,  Yale University  Press,
1994, p. 195.
73  Joseph V. Brogan, “A Mirror of Enlightenment: Rational Choice Debates”, Review of
Politics, n°58, 1996, pp. 793–806.
74   Mechrhild  Leutner,  “Politik  undWissenschaft:  Die  Marginalisierung  nicht-
philologischer  Ansätze  und  die  Konstruktion  der  Sinologie  als  Philologie”,  Berliner
China-Hefte, n°20, 2001, pp. 7–30.
75   Pierre  Ryckmans  (Simon  Leys),  “Orientalism  and  Sinology”,  ASAA  Review
(Australian Asian Studies Association), April 1983–April 1984, p. 20.
76  Vicente L. Rafael, “The Cultures of Area Studies in the United States”, Social Text,
n°41, 1994, p. 91.
77  Benjamin A. Elman, From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects
of Change in Late Imperial China, Cambridge, Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard
University, 1984.
78  Rosalind Coward and Ellis  John,  Language and Materialism: Developments  in
Semiology and the Theory of the Subject, London, RKP, 1977.
79  Hans Aarsleff,  From Locke to Saussure: Essays on the Study of  Language and
Intellectual History, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1982, p. 281.
80  Ibid., pp. 42-83.
81  Ibid., p. 22.
82  Louis Marin, Food for Thought, translated by Mette Hjort, Baltimore, MD, Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1989, p. 4.
83  Hugo Friedrich, “On the Art of Translation”, Translated by Rainer Schulte and John
Biguenet,  in  Schulte  and Biguenet  (dir.),  Theories  of  Translation:  An Anthology of
Essays from Dryden to Derrida, 1992, pp. 12-13.
84  Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, Vol. 1, London, Longman Green,
Longman and Roberts, 1861, p. 123.
85  George A. Kennedy, The Selected Works of George A. Kennedy, New Haven, CT,
Yale University Press, 1965, p. 104.
86  Umberto Eco, The Search for the Perfect Language, Translated by James Fentress,
Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, pp. 114-115.
87  Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, Vol. 1, London, Longman Green,
Longman and Roberts, 1861, p. 162.
88  Ibid., pp. 156-157.
89  Ibid., p. 158.
90   V.  N.  Voloshinov,  Marxism  and  the  Philosophy  of  Language,  Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 14.
Lead Us Not into Translation: Notes Toward a Theoretical Foundation for Asian Studies
http://transtexts.revues.org/458
91  Max Müller, Ibid., p. 14.
92  Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences,New
York, Vintage, 1970, pp. 296-297.
93  Raymond Schwab, The Oriental Renaissance: Europe’s Rediscovery of India and
the East,  1680–1880,  translated by Gene Patterson-Black and Victor  Reinking,  New
York, Columbia University Press, 1986.
94  Lewis A. Maverick, China: A Model for Europe, San Antonio, TX, Paul Anderson,
1946.
95  Lawrence Venuti, The Translator’s Invisibility: A History of Translation, London,
Routledge, 1995.
96  Paul Cohen, Discovering History in China, New York, Columbia University Press,
1984, pp. 196-197.
97  Louis Marin, Food for Thought, translated by Mette Hjort, Baltimore, MD, Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1989, pp. 12-14.
98  Sigmund Freud, The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, Translated and edited by A.
A. Brill, New York, Random House, 1966, p. 191.
99  Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, London, Verso, 1989, p.11.
100  I. R. Titunik, “The Formal Method and the Sociological Method (M. M. Bahktin, P.
N. Medvedev, V. N. Voloshinov) in Russian Theory and Study of Literature”, in V. N.
Voloshinov,  Marxism  and  the  Philosophy  of  Language,  Cambridge,  Cambridge
University Press, 1973, p. 191.
101   Mixail  Baxtin  [Mikhail  Bakhtin],  “Discourse  Typology  in  Prose”,  in  Ladislav
Matejka and Krystyna Pomorska (dir.),  Readings in Russian Poetics:  Formalist  and
Structuralist Views, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1971, pp. 196-198.
102   V.  N.  Voloshinov,  Marxism  and  the  Philosophy  of  Language,  Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1973.
103  Bernard S. Cohn, “The Command of Language and the Language of Command”, in
Ranajit  Guha  (dir.),  Subaltern  Studies  IV:  Writings  on  South  Asian  History  and
Society, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985.
104  Stephen Stigler,  The History of  Statistics:  Measurement of  Uncertainty before
1900, Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986, p. 95.
105   Bruno  Latour,  We  Have  Never  Been  Modern,  translated  by  Catherine  Porter,
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 18 and p. 35.
106  Stephen Stigler, Ibid., pp. 265-266.
107  Library of Congress, Library of Congress Asian Collections: An Illustrated Guide,
Washington, DC, Library of Congress, 2000, p. 13, p. 32 and p. 46.
108  Dipesh Chakrabarty,  “Reconstructing Liberalism? Notes  toward a  Conversation
between Area Studies and Diasporic Studies”, Public Culture, n°10, 1998, pp. 457–481.
109  Julian H. Stewart, Area Research: Theory and Practice, New York, SSRC, 1950, p.
xi.
110  Tani E. Barlow, “Colonialism’s Career in Postwar China Studies”, Positions, vol. I,
1993, pp. 224-267.
111   Ramon  H.  Myers  and  Thomas  A.  Metzer,  “Sinological  Shadows:  The  State  of
Modern China Studies in the U.S.”, Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, n°4, 1980,
pp. 1–34.
112  Chalmers Johnson, “What’s Wrong with Chinese Political Studies”, Asian Survey,
October, 1982, pp. 919–933.
Pour citer cet article
Référence électronique
Michael DUTTON, « Lead Us Not into Translation: Notes Toward a Theoretical
Foundation for Asian Studies », Transtext(e)s Transcultures 跨文本跨文化 [En ligne],
7 | 2012, mis en ligne le 02 décembre 2012, consulté le 24 avril 2013. URL :





MICHAEL DUTTON is Professor in the Department of Politics, Goldsmiths College,
University of London and formerly Professor of Political Cultures at the Griffith Asia
Institute, Griffith University. Professor Dutton's research is characterized by a strong
interest in contemporary social and cultural theory wed to a specific 'archive' called
China. This has led to a range of rather disparate set of issues that quite often move his
work out of the specifics of China. His current interests include an investigation of the
politics of the gift, a study of the friend/enemy distinction, and an appreciation of the
importance of everyday life in the flow of politics.
MICHAEL DUTTON est Professeur au sein du Département de science politique de
Goldsmiths College de l’Université de Londres, anciennement Professeur de cultures
politiques au Griffith Asia Institute à l’Université Griffith. Ses recherches sont
caractérisées par un fort intérêt pour la théorie sociale et culturelle contemporaine ainsi
que pour une ‘archive’ particulière dénommée Chine. Ceci l’a mené à l’étude d’un
éventail de questions diverses qui ont souvent déplacé son travail en dehors du cas
précis de la Chine. Ses intérêts actuels portent sur les politiques du don, la distinction
ami/ennemi, et l’importance de la vie quotidienne dans le flux politique.
Droits d’auteur
© Tous droits réservés
Lead Us Not into Translation: Notes Toward a Theoretical Foundation for Asian Studies
http://transtexts.revues.org/458
